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Abstract: We investigate the influence of one main anti tax avoidance measure, controlled 
foreign corporation (CFC) rules, on cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A) activity on a 
global scale. Using three different statistical methods and a large M&A data set, we find that 
CFC rules distort ownership patterns due to a competitive advantage of multinational entities 
whose parents reside in non-CFC rule countries. First, we show that the probability of being 
the acquirer of a low-tax target decreases if CFC rules may be applicable to this target’s 
income. Second, we show that CFC rules distort the acquirer’s location choice of targets. 
Third, we show that CFC rules negatively affect the probability of being the acquirer in a 
cross-border M&A. Altogether, this study shows that for affected acquirer countries, CFC 
rules lead to less M&A activity in low-tax countries because profit shifting seems to be less 
feasible. This behavior change could result in an increase in global corporate tax revenue. 
 
Keywords: International taxation • CFC rules • Profit shifting • Mergers and acquisitions 
• Multinational entities 
JEL Classification: F23 • G34 • H25 • H26 • H32 • H73 
 
*The authors gratefully acknowledge the constructive comments and suggestions from 
Michael Devereux, James Hines, Patrick Klein, Martin Ruf, Ulrich Schreiber, Johannes 
Voget, seminar participants at Stanford University and workshop participants at the 2017 
European Accounting Association Annual Congress as well as at the Universities of 
Mannheim and Tuebingen. Any errors, however, remain the responsibility of the authors. 
 
a
Dominik von Hagen, Chair of Business Administration and Taxation, Business School, 
University of Mannheim, 68131 Mannheim, Germany; E-mail: vonhagen@bwl.uni-
mannheim.de 
b
Axel Prettl, Chair of International Business Taxation, Faculty of Economics and Social 
Sciences, University of Tuebingen, 72074 Tuebingen, Germany; E-mail: axel@prettl2.de 
2 / 44 
 
1 Introduction 
Globalization and its accompanying effects in various business fields such as reallocation of 
production or new customers all around the world are current challenges that multinational 
entities (MNEs) are facing globally. Further, in all these various dimensions, MNEs and 
countries, which are concerned about their tax revenue, compete against each other. In 
addition, international tax law, once a rather minor concern in corporate tax planning, has 
become increasingly important and MNEs try to use tax loopholes within international tax 
law to minimize their overall tax payments. One way to minimize tax payments can be 
realized by MNE-wide profit shifting, which is intensely discussed in current tax policy 
debates as the “Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” (BEPS) project (OECD/G20 (2015)) of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) or the anti tax avoidance 
directive of the European Union (EU) (European Council (2016)) show. Further, empirical 
literature provides extensive evidence of MNE-wide profit shifting strategies (e.g., Huizinga 
and Laeven (2008), Weichenrieder (2009), Grubert (2012), Dharmapala and Riedel (2013)). 
The basic idea of such profit shifting strategies is to reduce taxable income in high-tax 
countries by, e.g., royalty or interest payments from high-tax to low-tax subsidiaries.
1
 
Several countries, however, have implemented anti tax avoidance measures to counteract this 
profit shifting behavior. The three major measures are transfer pricing rules, thin 
capitalization or interest stripping rules and controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules. This 
study tries to shine some light on CFC rules, which aim at MNE-wide profit shifting strategies 
by immediately taxing profits of low-tax subsidiaries, redistributed or not, in the MNE’s 
parent country if certain conditions are fulfilled. Hence, CFC rules make typical profit 
shifting strategies unattractive for an MNE (e.g., Altshuler and Hubbard (2003), Ruf and 
Weichenrieder (2012)), since these strategies do no longer reduce the MNE’s tax burden.  
If a company decides to engage in tax avoidance or to extend its existing tax avoidance 
strategies, it could try to establish a foreign subsidiary in a low-tax country as a profit shifting 
vehicle, where profits are taxed at a low rate. There are two common ways to establish a 
foreign subsidiary: greenfield investment in a new firm or buying an existing company. Our 
study focuses on the latter one, cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As), which is 
considered an important form of foreign direct investment (FDI) (UNCTAD (2017)). 
Additionally, even more profit shifting opportunities may be given by acquiring a foreign 
firm, such as using existing loss carry forwards. Based on the argumentation above, one can 
easily imagine that the existence and strength of CFC rules that try to counteract such 
                                                 
1
 A typical profit shifting strategy looks as follows: An MNE equips a subsidiary in a low-tax country with 
intellectual property (IP) and equity. This subsidiary then may license IP to the parent or subsidiaries in high-tax 
countries that pay transfer prices (royalties) in exchange for using IP. Further, the low-tax subsidiary may 
provide debt to the parent or subsidiaries in high-tax countries that pay interest in exchange for the internal loan. 
Taken together, the royalty and interest expenses reduce taxable income in high-tax countries and increase 
income in low-tax countries. 
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behavior could have an impact on cross-border M&As and, thereby, on ownership structures 
of MNEs. 
We investigate whether CFC rules influence ownership patterns on a global scale by 
analyzing the effect of CFC rules on cross-border M&As. In our different econometrical 
analyses, we investigate a large data set of worldwide M&A deals with around 14,000 
observations and a hand-collected detailed CFC rule data set of 29 countries, extended by 
countries that do not have CFC rules, for the period 2002 to 2014. We find that CFC rules 
impact cross-border M&A activity in two ways. 
First, we detect that CFC rules distort the acquisition of low-tax targets. In particular, we 
observe that the probability of acquiring a low-tax target is negatively influenced by potential 
CFC rule application on the low-tax target’s income. Our explanation for this finding is that 
MNEs with parents in non-CFC rule countries (non-CFC rule MNEs) calculate higher 
reservation prices for low-tax targets than MNEs with parents in CFC rule countries (CFC 
rule MNEs), because these targets may be used as valuable profit shifting vehicles within 
non-CFC rule MNEs. CFC rule MNEs, on the other side, fear the application of CFC rules on 
low-tax targets’ income, which decreases after-tax cash flows. Hence, they calculate lower 
reservation prices for cross-border M&As than non-CFC rule MNEs. 
Second, we detect that CFC rules distort the direction of cross-border M&As between firms. 
In particular, we observe that if a firm acquires another non-domestic firm, CFC rules 
negatively affect the M&A direction, i.e., which firm becomes the acquirer and, thereby, the 
parent of the newly formed MNE. This finding is in line with previous research by Voget 
(2011), who detects that the presence of CFC rules increases the number of headquarters 
relocation. However, our approach differs from Voget (2011) by using a different 
identification strategy and analyzing M&A observations from a different database. 
Our paper contributes to tax research and policy considerations in three ways. First, we 
contribute to empirical tax research on the effects of CFC rules on firm behavior, where little 
research has been undertaken so far (see Section 2). As Egger and Wamser (2015) point out, 
this may be due to the difficulty of isolating the effect of anti tax avoidance measures on 
MNEs who operate in multiple jurisdictions and avail complex group interrelations with 
respect to, e.g., financing decisions. In addition, the effect of CFC rules is difficult to identify 
as the applicability of CFC rules depends on the foreign subsidiary’s characteristics as well as 
its host-country’s characteristics. To overcome these identification difficulties, we do not only 
follow a mere dummy variable approach on the presence or non-presence of CFC rules; 
moreover, we go into the details of each country’s CFC rules by considering individual 
components of CFC rules. 
Second, we contribute to empirical tax research in the field of M&As and their tax-related 
determinants. Indeed, there are many empirical studies on the effect of taxes on M&As from 
various perspectives, e.g., repatriation taxes (Voget (2011), Hanlon et al. (2015), Edwards et 
al. (2016), Feld et al. (2016a)), international double taxation (Huizinga and Voget (2009), 
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Huizinga et al. (2012)) or capital gains taxes (Ayers et al. (2003), Ayers et al. (2007), Feld et 
al. (2016b), Huizinga et al. (2017)). However, besides Voget (2011), there are to our 
knowledge no published empirical studies that compare the effect of anti tax avoidance 
measures on M&A activity over various countries. In particular, there is no such study about 
the increasingly important CFC rules. However, since anti tax avoidance measures are 
expanding as shown in Figure 1, the strand of literature dealing with location choices of 
MNEs and their tax-related elements becomes as important. 
 
Figure 1. Changes in anti profit shifting measures over time for 49 
countries (OECD, G20 and EU member countries). 
 
Source: Own data collection. 
 
Third, understanding how CFC rules influence M&A activity on a global scale is also of 
economic interest, as cross-border M&As are an important form of FDI: In 2016, the value of 
cross-border M&As accounted globally for 869 billion USD, which slightly exceeded the 
value of announced greenfield projects (828 billion USD, UNCTAD (2017)). Hence, our 
analysis on distortionary tax effects on cross-border M&As is also of interest from a global 
economic and not only from countries’ tax policy perspective. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives a brief review of empirical 
literature on CFC rules. Section 3 provides our analysis of the effect of CFC rules on the 
acquisition of low-tax targets. Section 4 analyzes the effect of CFC rules on the direction of 
cross-border M&As. Finally, Section 5 sets forth our conclusions. 
2 Empirical literature on CFC rules 
CFC rules are applicable at an MNE’s parent level and usually work as follows: If an MNE’s 
foreign subsidiary fulfills certain requirements, at least a part of its income is taxed in the 
MNE’s parent country where the CFC rule is enacted, even if no repatriation takes place. 
Thereby, MNE-wide profit shifting strategies become mostly ineffective. Typically, three 
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requirements are crucial for CFC rule application: Low taxation of the foreign subsidiary, 
passive income of the subsidiary, and minimum ownership in the subsidiary. There is a high 
degree of variation in how CFC rules are specified, e.g., regarding what is considered low 
taxation or regarding a passive-to-active-income ratio that may trigger CFC rule application. 
Despite the far-reaching consequences of CFC rules on MNEs’ tax burdens, empirical studies 
on the effects of CFC rules on firm behavior are scarce. Altshuler and Hubbard (2003) find 
that tightening US CFC rules in 1986 has substantially reduced tax planning opportunities 
with financial services firms in low-tax countries; three years later, Altshuler and Grubert 
(2006) show that the so-called check-the-box rule, which may allow for an escape from CFC 
rules for US MNEs, abolished these effects. For a panel of German MNEs, Ruf and 
Weichenrieder (2012) detect that German CFC rules are effective in reducing passive 
investments in low-tax countries. These studies show that CFC rules reach the intended goal 
of reducing profit shifting opportunities with low-tax subsidiaries. However, Egger and 
Wamser (2015) find that German MNEs, whose subsidiaries are subject to CFC rules, also 
show significantly lower fixed assets in these subsidiaries. They conclude that CFC rules lead 
to an increase in cost of capital if subsidiaries are treated by CFC rules. Hence, by influencing 
real activity abroad, the application of CFC rules can also have non-intended “real” effects. 
These findings contradict the theoretical thoughts from Weichenrieder (1996) who shows that 
certain characteristics of CFC rules, such as an accepted passive-to active-income ratio, can 
lower the cost of capital in foreign subsidiaries under certain circumstances. 
We aim to contribute to the scarce literature on CFC rules by investigating the effects of CFC 
rules on an important form of FDI—cross-border M&A activity—that accounts for almost 
1 trillion USD in 2016 (UNCTAD (2017)). In particular, in Section 3, we investigate whether 
CFC rules influence the acquisition of low-tax targets that potentially fall under the scope of 
CFC rules. In Section 4, we investigate whether CFC rules influence the direction of cross-
border M&As between firms, i.e., which firm becomes the acquirer and, thereby, the parent of 
the newly formed MNE. 
3 CFC rules and the acquisition of low-tax targets 
3.1 Hypothesis development 
Non-CFC rule MNEs face fewer constraints in implementing profit shifting strategies within 
their group than CFC rule MNEs.
2
 That is because CFC rules aim at profits shifted to low-tax 
subsidiaries within the MNE and, thereby, make typical profit shifting strategies less 
                                                 
2
 In our analysis on the effects of CFC rules on cross-border M&A activity, we consider CFC rules in the country 
of the MNE’s parent to be relevant. The reason is straightforward: On the one side, a non-CFC rule MNE gets 
into a worse tax position if the acquisition is done via a CFC rule subsidiary; hence, the MNE would not acquire 
through this subsidiary. In support of this reasoning, Lewellen and Robinson (2014) find that the likelihood of 
choosing a subsidiary as a holding firm within an MNE is significantly lower if that subsidiary resides in a CFC 
rule country. On the other side, a CFC rule MNE does not get into a better tax position if the acquisition is done 
via a non-CFC rule subsidiary, because the parent’s CFC rule would overall still be applicable in the MNE. 
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attractive for an MNE. Following the argumentation and findings of Egger and Wamser 
(2015), CFC rules even increase the cost of capital of subsidiaries that fall under the scope of 
CFC rules. Consequently, it is less attractive for a CFC rule MNE to acquire a low-tax target 
that may fall under the scope of CFC rules compared to a non-CFC rule MNE. Put differently, 
for a non-CFC rule MNE, a low-tax target could function—in addition to other synergies—as 
a profit shifting vehicle within the MNE. This additional function could make a candidate 
target more valuable for this MNE compared to a CFC rule MNE without such profit shifting 
opportunities. Due to this competitive advantage, non-CFC rule MNEs may calculate higher 
reservation prices for foreign low-tax targets compared to CFC rule MNEs. We, therefore, 
hypothesize the following, stated in alternative form: 
Hypothesis 1a: The probability of being the acquirer of a given low-tax target in a cross-
border M&A is higher for non-CFC rule MNEs compared to MNEs that potentially have to 
apply CFC rules on this target’s income. 
Hypothesis 1a investigates the influence of CFC rules on the likelihood of acquiring a given 
target that acquirers from various countries bid for. We also take the “opposite” perspective 
that a given acquirer has the choice to buy a target out of a pool of targets from various 
countries. Based on the reasoning above—it is less attractive for a CFC rule MNE to acquire a 
low-tax target that may fall under the scope of CFC rules compared to a target that does not 
fall under the scope of CFC rule—we hypothesize the following, stated in alternative form: 
Hypothesis 1b: The probability of being the target of a given acquirer in a cross-border M&A 
is lower for targets that potentially fall under the scope of CFC rules of this acquirer 
compared to targets that do not fall under the scope of CFC rules of this acquirer. 
Almost all observed CFC rules include a so-called “minimum low tax rate threshold” 
requirement, which determines whether the foreign subsidiary's country is considered a low-
tax country. This requirement varies over countries and time. We use these low tax rate 
thresholds to determine whether the target is located in a low-tax country so that CFC rules 
are potentially applicable. Acquirers from countries with CFC rules and a low tax rate 
threshold could especially aim for targets that are located in countries with a statutory 
corporate tax rate (STR) below their own one but above the low tax rate threshold to achieve 
tax rate advantages. If, however, the target is located in a country with a higher STR than the 
acquirer’s country STR, we argue that non-CFC rule acquirers may be more prone to buy 
these targets. This argument is motivated by the following consideration: These acquirers—
other than CFC rule acquirers—could shift profits out of the high-tax target country. We, 
therefore, hypothesize the following, stated in alternative form: 
Hypothesis 1c: The probability of being the acquirer (medium-tax target
3
) of a given 
medium-tax target (given acquirer) in a cross-border M&A is higher for CFC rule MNEs 
                                                 
3
 A “medium-tax target” is a target, which is located in a country with an STR above the minimum low tax rate 
threshold but below the STR of the specific acquirer country. 
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compared to non-CFC rule MNEs. Additionally, the probability of being the acquirer of a 
target in a country with a higher STR than in the acquirer’s country is lower for CFC rule 
acquirers than for non-CFC rule acquirers. 
3.2 Empirical approach 
Our empirical approach to analyze the probability of being the actual acquirer country among 
several candidate acquirer countries follows the common assumption in M&A literature that 
M&As reflect synergies from combining two firms with all assets being priced at their fair 
value (e.g., Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Becker and Fuest (2010), Feld et al. (2016a)) 
where 
                               (1) 
is the value of target k in country j if it was owned by an acquirer from country i.
4
 The term 
      reflects the higher burden of potential taxation of target income due to CFC rules in the 
acquirer country i if the target is located in country j. The variable vector      contains various 
country control variables to capture owner-country-specific synergies realized through a 
potential M&A.      is the residual. Coefficients   and   are the estimated parameters. In this 
approach, the target is the same for every concerned M&A; therefore, we automatically 
account for target firm, target country and time fixed effects. Hence, these fixed effects do not 
need to be included. We control for acquirer country fixed effects. In robustness checks, we 
also include specific target and acquirer firm controls. 
We use the fact that a foreign firm from country i will acquire a target if the value for this 
target is higher than for any other candidate acquirer from country h, i.e., 
                      ,        (2) 
where I indicates the number of candidate acquirer countries. We analyze the probability that 
a particular acquirer buys a target, depending on potential application of CFC rules in the 
country of that particular acquirer and given that we know that the transaction takes place, 
which is given by: 
               
                 
                  
 
   
               .   (3) 
Expression (3) considers a choice model assuming that M&As reflect synergies from 
combining two firms and that acquirers value the individual firms and the M&A correctly at 
their fair value. Using conditional logit and mixed logit regression models, we aim to 
calculate               .
5
 
                                                 
4
 We suppress a time subscript t in the interest of readability of the model. 
5
 The presented multinomial choice model is based on Feld et al. (2016a), p. 15. 
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In our first approach, the difference between CFC rules is shown by a treatment effect using a 
simple dummy variable if a CFC rule is enacted in the acquirer country i and is potentially 
applicable on target income, i.e., the STR in target country j is below the minimum low tax 
rate threshold of the CFC rule of the candidate acquirer country i. Hence, the first variable of 
interest is constructed as 
           
                                                      
                                    
                                                                                  
    (4) 
where             is the tax rate threshold of the CFC rule of the candidate acquirer country i 
and    is the STR in the target country j. 
In our first approach, the treatment effect is assumed to be homogenous. In our second 
approach, we consider heterogeneity by using the tax rate differential between the home and 
host countries as a finer metering of the treatment. In particular, we consider the additional 
taxes payable due to CFC rule application if the target is used as a profit shifting vehicle
6
: 
          
                                                        
                                          
                                                                                           
    (5) 
For both approaches, we expect a negative sign of the regression coefficients   according to 
Hypothesis 1a and 1b derived in Section 3.1. 
In a third step, to address Hypothesis 1c, we take a different approach and split up the targets 
into three groups: Group (1) contains targets with STRs below the low tax rate threshold of 
the CFC rule; group (2) contains targets with STRs below the acquirer STRs but above the tax 
rate threshold of the CFC rule; group (3) contains targets with STRs higher than the acquirer 
STRs if the acquirer country applies CFC rules. Figure 2 illustrates this target grouping. 
  
                                                 
6
       (and not   ) are the additional taxes because the observed CFC rules grant a credit for the taxes paid by 
the foreign subsidiary in its host country. 
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Figure 2. Target location among the three groups. 
 
    Below (1)   Above (2)              Higher (3) 
     
Target STR  
                  0  Tax rate threshold of CFC rule   Acquirer STR 
 
        
                                                                       
                                                                
                                                                                                          
   (6) 
        
                                                                        
 
                                                                                              
    (7) 
         
                                                         
 
                                                                                              
    (8) 
 
If the target STR (  ) is below the tax rate threshold of the CFC rule, there is additional 
taxation in the acquirer country at the acquirer STR (  ) as already shown in (5). We expect a 
negative coefficient of Below since these targets are unattractive to acquire from a CFC rule 
perspective. 
If    is above the tax rate threshold of the CFC rule but below   , the acquirer could shift 
profits to the target and reduce his effective tax burden by      . We expect a positive 
coefficient of Above as profits could be shifted—without CFC rule application—to the target, 
which may be particularly attractive for CFC rule acquirers. 
If    is higher than   , profit shifting in the here observed way to the target does not make 
sense as the target resides in a higher taxed country. We expect a negative coefficient of 
Higher since the high-tax target is unattractive for CFC rule acquirers from a tax perspective. 
Moreover, non-CFC rule acquirers could be more prone to acquire such targets as these 
acquirers may shift profits out of the high-tax target. 
In our robustness test, we check whether our results are robust to considering effective 
average tax rates (EATRs) as CFC rules usually take into account the effective tax burden of 
the foreign low-tax subsidiary. Since we do not observe the effective tax burden of the targets, 
we use country-level EATRs from the Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation to 
determine whether a target may fall under the scope of CFC rules: 
              
                                                            
                                                  
                                                                                                  
   (9) 
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In a further robustness test, we consider the scope of income included by the CFC rule. While 
some CFC rules only include passive income of the subsidiary, some CFC rules include 
passive and active income. Therefore, we let the treatment effect differ in this regard: 








                                                           
                                             
                                   
       
 
                                                  
                                             
                                              
                                                                                       
    (10) 
According to this differentiation, all targets are taxed at their STR. Further, this differentiation 
takes into account the additional CFC rule tax burden—assuming that active and passive 
income in the target are at the same height—in the following way: If CFC rules include the 
full target income once triggered, the total tax burden is set to the acquirer STR. If CFC rules 
include only target’s passive income once triggered, the total tax burden is set to the average 
between target and acquirer STR. 
The approach presented above takes an acquirer perspective by analyzing why a given target 
is bought by an acquirer from a specific country (Hypothesis 1a). In a second analysis, we 
follow the same logic but take a target perspective by analyzing why a given acquirer chooses 
to buy a target from a specific country (Hypothesis 1b).
7
 
Following Feld et al. (2016a) and Arulampalam et al. (2017), we include several control 
variables in both perspectives. We control for STR and economic indicators, such as GDP per 
capita, GDP growth, stock market capitalization per GDP and credits granted to private sector 
per GDP in the country of the candidate acquirer (or target), depending on whether the 
acquirer (or target) perspective is taken. Further, we control for several distance variables, 
such as the distance between the acquirer and target country, whether the acquirer and target 
have a common language, whether the acquirer and target were ever in a colonial relationship 
and whether the legal system of the acquirer and target country have common legal origins. In 
the target perspective, we additionally include variables to control for the institutional 
framework of the candidate target country, such as corruption control, business start-up costs, 
unemployment rate and number of listed domestic firms. 
3.3 Data 
Data for the empirical analysis is taken from the Thomson Financial SDC database, which 
contains worldwide M&A transactions. We have selected all completed M&As for the period 
2002 to 2014 through which majority control (>50%) of the targets has been attained.
8
 
                                                 
7
 Such a target perspective is also taken by Arulampalam et al. (2017). 
8
 All observed CFC rules have a participation threshold below or equal to 50% so that the majority control 
requirement of CFC rules is always fulfilled. 
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Further, for each M&A, country of the acquirer ultimate parent, direct acquirer, target 
ultimate parent and direct target must be given.
9
 In addition, we require that the acquirer 
ultimate parent and the target reside in different countries and that the acquirer ultimate parent 
and direct acquirer reside in the same country to reduce the possibility of a subsidiary in a 
third country involved in the M&A. To keep the mixed logit regressions computationally 
feasible, the set of considered candidate acquirer countries (Hypothesis 1a) or candidate target 
countries (Hypothesis 1b) is restricted to the 30 most frequent acquirer or target locations.
10
 
These restrictions leave a sample of 14,421 cross-border M&As involving 55 countries to 
investigate Hypothesis 1a and a sample of 13,447 cross-border M&As involving 54 countries 
to investigate Hypothesis 1b. Table 2 and Table 8 give an overview over the number of 
acquirer ultimate parents and targets in the respective cross-border M&A sample per country. 
In line with di Giovanni (2005), we observe that countries with the largest financial markets 
have most observations in both samples. Further, these tables provide information on whether 
CFC rules are implemented in those countries. 
Data on CFC rules is based on IBFD European Tax Handbook (2002-2016), various corporate 
tax guides (Ernst & Young (2004-2016), Deloitte (2015), KPMG (2016)) and the specific tax 
law of each country. We have sampled various dimensions of CFC rules for the period 2002 
to 2014, such as: 
 tax rate threshold that triggers CFC rule, 
 country lists that trigger (blacklists) or do not trigger (whitelists) CFC rule, 
 threshold for passive-to-active-income ratio that triggers CFC rule, 
 whether active or only passive income of CFCs is included at the parent level, or 
 significant exemptions to CFC rule. 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Acquirer perspective 
Table 4 presents the baseline results of different multinomial choice models to test 
Hypothesis 1a on the influence of CFC rules on the likelihood of being the acquirer country of 
a given target (acquirer perspective). For each deal, the dependent variable equals one for the 
actual acquirer country of origin and zero for all other counterfactual acquirer countries. For 
definitions, data sources and summary statistics of all variables see Table 3. 
In the conditional logit regression (1),          from expression (4) is the variable of 
interest, which indicates potential taxation via CFC rules in the acquirer country. We observe 
a negative coefficient, which suggests that potential taxation in the acquirer country due to 
CFC rule application has a negative influence on the probability of being the acquirer country 
                                                 
9
 Throughout our paper, we use the terms “ultimate parent” and “parent” synonymously. 
10
 To investigate Hypothesis 1a, important control variables are missing for Guernsey, Luxembourg and Taiwan 
so that we effectively consider 27 candidate acquirer countries. To investigate Hypothesis 1b, important control 
variables are missing for Indonesia and Sweden so that we effectively consider 28 candidate target countries. 
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for a given target. To be more specific, we consider         from expression (5) in 
regression (2).         measures the magnitude of a potential additional tax burden due to 
CFC rule application and the coefficient is significantly negative. The substantially lower p-
value of         (p<0.000%) compared to          (p=19.9%) is probably due to 
introducing heterogeneity to the treatment effect by considering the specific tax rate 
differential between the acquirer and target country in case CFC rules apply. The coefficient 
of -1.4569 implies that if the target is potentially treated by CFC rules and the difference 
between acquirer STR and target STR increases by 1%, the likelihood of acquiring this targets 
decreases by 0.05%. Taken together, we provide evidence that potential CFC rule application 
on a target’s income reduces the probability of acquiring this target; this finding supports 
Hypothesis 1a. However, the calculated economic effect seems to be very low for small STR 
differences. 
As argued in Feld et al. (2016a), a violation of the assumption of the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) in the conditional logit model could be problematic because 
estimates may be biased. Consequently, we randomize our variables of interest by using a 
mixed logit estimator. This randomization follows a normal distribution with mean g and 
covariance W; the parameters are estimated by simulated maximum likelihood with 50 Halton 
draws.
11
 In our mixed logit regressions, we observe that the estimated standard deviations of 
the normal distribution are highly significant; therefore, we prefer this approach and apply 
mixed logit regressions in the remaining regressions. 
In regression (3), we observe that applying the mixed logit model does not change the basic 
results as         remains significantly negative at the 1% level and quantitatively stable. In 
regression (4), we cluster the standard errors at the target-country/year level and observe that 
        is significant at the 5% level. In regression (5), we split the targets as described in 
expressions (6), (7) and (8). Figure 3 shows a kernel density estimate of the simulated 
coefficients of the variables of interest. The significantly negative coefficient of Below 
confirms the results from previous regressions and also the significantly negative coefficient 
of Higher is as expected. This finding shows that it is less likely that a CFC rule acquirer buys 
a target, which is located in a country with a higher STR than the CFC rule acquirer. This 
finding supports Hypothesis 1c. However, the significantly negative coefficient of Above is 
counterintuitive as we hypothesized that firms from CFC rule countries are more likely to be 
the acquirer if the target is located in a country with an STR below the acquirer STR but 
above the tax rate threshold of the CFC rule. Hence, we reject Hypothesis 1c in the acquirer 
perspective. 
  
                                                 
11
 In untabulated regression results, we find that using 100 Halton draws produces very similar results in both the 
acquirer and target perspective; these results are available upon request. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of coefficients of Below, Above and Higher 
(acquirer perspective). 
 
This figure provides a graph of the Epanechnikov kernel density function 
of the simulated coefficients of Below, Above and Higher in regression (5) 
of Table 4 using simulated maximum likelihood with 50 Halton draws. 
The mean (standard deviation) of the simulated coefficients is -2.59 (0.40) 
for Below, -5.83 (1.20) for Above and -4.55 (0.66) for Higher. Density is 
on the y-axis and the coefficient is on the x-axis. 
 
Most control variables are highly significant and show the expected signs. Regarding STR, we 
find a negative effect on the likelihood to be the successful bidder if the bidder is located in a 
high-tax country. This finding is in line with Becker and Riedel (2012), who find a negative 
effect of parent STR on investment in foreign subsidiaries. Helpman et al. (2004) show that 
the productivity level of firms influences their investments abroad and firms with the highest 
productivity engage in FDI. Similar to other studies, we use lnGDPpercapita and GDPgrowth 
as proxies for productivity levels in an acquirer country and find that lnGDPpercapita has a 
significantly positive coefficient, while GDPgrowth is insignificant. Hence, a high level of 
GDP per capita has a positive impact on cross-border M&A activity. StockmarketSize has the 
expected positive coefficient, which indicates that well-developed stock markets in the 
acquirer country offer good financing conditions to raise capital to fund cross-border M&As. 
The size of the private credit market captured by PrivateCredit has an insignificant effect. 
Cross-border M&A literature finds that lower bilateral transaction costs between the acquirer 
and target due to less cultural and geographic distance positively affect M&A activity (e.g., di 
Giovanni (2005)). In line with these findings, we observe that lnDistance, CommonLanguage, 
ColonialRelationship, CommonLegalSystem show the expected signs and are highly 
significant. 
Table 5 provides the results of our check on whether our baseline results are robust to 
specification variations. In regression (1), we include a dummy variable capturing the 
unilateral method (i.e., the credit or exemption method on foreign dividends) to avoid double 
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taxation on foreign dividends. The significantly positive coefficient of ExemptionMethod 
indicates that the likelihood of being the acquirer increases if the acquirer resides in a country 
that exempts foreign dividends of the target from taxation, which is in line with the result of 
Feld et al. (2016a). In regressions (2), (3) and (4), we vary the calculation of our variable of 
interest by considering target effective average tax rates (           ), potential non-
application of CFC rules within the EEA (          )12 and the included income by CFC 
rules (          ). In regression (5), we additionally randomize STR and in regression (6), 
we exclude acquirers from Australia, Canada and New Zealand because their CFC rules do 
not explicitly mention a tax rate threshold, where our identification is coming from. 
Regression (7) excludes the largest acquirer countries (Canada, United Kingdom and United 
States), which account for around half of our observations. The exclusion of the US further 
checks for a potential bias due to the so-called check-the-box rule, which was introduced in 
the US in 1997 and may allow for an escape from CFC rules for US MNEs under specific 
circumstances by using hybrid entities (e.g., Altshuler and Grubert (2006), Mutti and Grubert 
(2009)). We observe that all robustness tests validate our baseline results, both quantitatively 
and qualitatively. 
Table 6 provides further robustness tests. In regression (1), we exclude all control variables 
except for the acquirer country fixed effects to check if there is a bias due to correlation 
between         and the control variables. We find that         decreases substantially and 
remains significant. Further, we check whether our results are robust to differentiating 
between profitable and loss-making targets in regression (2). Due to missing firm level 
variables, the sample decreases substantially. We find that the coefficients of               
and                   remain significantly negative. Interestingly, the effect is more 
pronounced for loss-making targets; the difference between the coefficients is significant at a 
p-value of 1.9% (two-sided). One possible reason could be that non-CFC rule acquirers are 
more interested in acquiring low-tax loss-making targets than CFC rule acquirers, because 
non-CFC rule acquirers may shift profits to the loss-making targets and, thereby, net out the 
losses—or even use existing loss carryforwards if possible—of these targets. Finally, 
regressions (3), (4) and (5) control for target-specific financial data (total assets, return on 
assets, sales and earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) by interacting 
these consolidated profit and loss statement and balance sheet items with each candidate 
acquirer country. While again the sample size decreases substantially, we observe that 
        remains significantly negative. 
3.4.2 Target perspective 
With the same econometric idea as in Section 3.4.1 but with a target perspective, we analyze 
for each given acquirer the origin of the eventual target country among a choice set of various 
                                                 
12
 Ruf and Weichenrieder (2013) investigate the Cadbury-Schweppes ruling of the European Court of Justice in 
2007, which triggered a substantial mitigation of the application of CFC rules within the European Economic 
Area (EEA). In line with this argumentation, the authors find evidence for a relative increase in passive 
investments in low-tax EEA subsidiaries and a parallel decrease in passive investments in non-EEA subsidiaries. 
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target countries (target perspective). Table 10 presents the baseline results of different 
multinomial choice models to test Hypothesis 1b on the influence of CFC rules on the 
likelihood of being chosen as the target country of a given acquirer. For each deal, the 
dependent variable equals one for the actual target country of origin and zero for all other 
counterfactual target countries. For definitions, data sources and summary statistics of all 
variables see Table 9. Due to a different perspective and additional control variables, the data 
set differs from the former data set in Section 3.4.1. 
In the conditional logit regression (1),          has a significantly negative coefficient, 
which indicates that potential CFC rule application on a candidate target’s income has a 
negative effect on actually choosing the target country as a location.         measures in 
more detail the magnitude of a potential additional tax burden due to CFC rule application 
and—similar to the result in Section 3.4.1—the significance level increases compared to the 
mere dummy variable approach (        ). In line with Hypothesis 1b, this finding 
indicates that potential CFC rule application on target’s income negatively influences the 
target location choice of a given acquirer. From a global perspective and with an increasing 
number of countries introducing or strengthening CFC rules, this finding may further indicate 
higher overall tax revenue due to less profit shifting opportunities. 
To cope with a possible violation of the IIA (see Section 3.4.1), we use again a mixed logit 
estimator and randomize our variables of interest in the remaining regressions. Again, we 
observe that the estimated standard deviations of the normal distribution are highly 
significant; therefore, we prefer this approach and apply mixed logit regressions in the 
remaining regressions. We observe a further decrease of         and the significance level 
remains stable in regression (3) and regression (4), where we cluster the standard errors at the 
acquirer-country/year level. In regression (5), we observe a similar pattern as in Section 3.4.1 
and Figure 4 shows a kernel density estimate of the simulated coefficients of the variables of 
interest. Again, the coefficients of Below and Higher are significantly negative, which is in 
line with Hypothesis 1c and suggests that the likelihood of target location choice decreases if 
the target potentially falls under the scope of CFC rule or has a higher STR than the acquirer. 
However, we again observe that Above is significantly negative, which is counterintuitive, 
because we would expect that targets are more likely to be acquired if they are located in a 
country with an STR below the acquirer STR but above the tax rate threshold of the acquirer’s 
CFC rule. Hence, also in the target perspective, we reject Hypothesis 1c. 
  
16 / 44 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of coefficients of Below, Above and Higher 
(target perspective). 
 
This figure provides a graph of the Epanechnikov kernel density function 
of the simulated coefficients of Below, Above and Higher in regression (5) 
of Table 10 using simulated maximum likelihood with 50 Halton draws. 
The mean (standard deviation) of the simulated coefficients is -4.71 (0.60) 
for Below, -8.61 (1.00) for Above and -1.15 (0.54) for Higher. Density is 
on the y-axis and the coefficient is on the x-axis. 
 
Regarding significant control variables, we observe that STR has a positive effect on target 
location choice, which is an unexpected result as FDI literature generally suggests a negative 
effect of host country STR on host country investment (e.g., Feld and Heckemeyer (2011)). 
An explanation for this result could be that cross-border M&As are less sensitive to host 
country STRs (e.g., Hebous et al. (2011), Herger et al. (2016)) or that profit shifting structures 
within the acquiring MNE mitigate this effect (e.g., Arulampalam et al. (2017)). Additionally, 
variation of STR is also used to compose our variable of interest, which may lead to 
interdependencies. Finally, the significantly positive effect of STR does not prove to be 
robust. 
Regarding control variables, lnGDPpercapita and StockmarketSize have insignificant 
coefficients, whereas GDPgrowth has a significantly positive effect in some regressions, i.e., 
targets located in growing economies are more likely to be acquired. Further, PrivateCredit 
has a significantly negative effect on target location choice. The explanation for this finding 
may be the following: If a target is located in a country with a low ratio of private credits 
granted to the private sector, the supply of credits may be limited. Consequently, credit supply 
for internal expansion is limited, which makes targets in these countries more likely to be 
acquired (Arulampalam et al. (2017)). Similar to the findings in Section 3.4.1, we observe that 
lower bilateral transaction costs between the acquirer and target positively affect target 
location choice: lnDistance, CommonLanguage and ColonialRelationship have the expected 
significant coefficient; CommonLegalSystem has an expected positive though insignificant 
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estimate. Finally, the control variables for the institutional framework in the candidate target 
country have significant explanatory power. A high degree of corruption control, a large 
number of listed firms and low business start-up costs increase the chances to be chosen as 
target location; unemployment rate has an insignificant effect. 
In Table 11, we provide similar robustness tests as in Table 5 and yield similar results. 
Regressions (1), (2), and (3) take into account target effective average tax rates 
(           ), potential non-application of CFC rules within the EEA (          ) and the 
included income by CFC rules (          ). In regression (4), we additionally randomize 
STR and in regression (5), we exclude acquirers from Australia, Canada and New Zealand 
because their CFC rules do not explicitly mention a tax rate threshold. Regression (6) 
excludes the largest target countries (Germany, United Kingdom and United States), which 
account for almost half of our observations. In regression (7), we include BusinessDisclosure 
as a further variable for the institutional framework in the candidate target country. This 
variable is not included in our baseline results since its inclusion significantly drops the 
observation number. We observe that all robustness tests resemble our baseline results, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. 
Table 12 provides further robustness tests yielding similar results as presented in Table 6. In 
regression (1), we exclude all control variables except for the target country fixed effects to 
check if there is a bias due to correlation between         and the control variables. Again, 
we find that         decreases substantially and remains significant. Further, we check 
whether our results are robust to differentiating between profitable and loss-making targets in 
regression (2). We find that the coefficients of               and                   remain 
significantly negative; however, in this robustness test, there is no significant difference 
between the coefficients of               and                  . Finally, in regressions (3), 
(4) and (5), we include acquirer-specific financial data (total assets, return on assets, sales and 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) by interacting these 
consolidated profit and loss statement and balance sheet items with each candidate target 
country. We again observe a substantial sample decrease due missing firm level variables, but 
the results prove to be robust. 
4 CFC rules and the direction of cross-border M&As 
4.1 Hypothesis development 
In this section, we consider the direction of cross-border M&As. In particular, we investigate 
whether CFC rules affect the decision which firm becomes the parent firm of a newly created 
MNE through a cross-border M&A. Following the finding of Voget (2011) that CFC rules 
trigger the relocation of headquarters, we argue that CFC rules negatively influence the 
direction of a cross-border M&A between two firms from different countries, i.e., we expect 
that it is more probable that the non-CFC rule firm acquires the CFC rule firm. The reasoning 
is as follows: If the non-CFC rule firm becomes the new MNE’s parent, potential (new) profit 
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shifting strategies may arise by setting up or using an already existing tax haven subsidiary 
within the MNE, which potentially decreases the overall tax burden. These (new) profit 
shifting strategies would not exist if the CFC rule firm became the acquirer due to potential 
CFC rule application on low-tax subsidiaries’ income. We, therefore, hypothesize the 
following, stated in alternative form: 
Hypothesis 2: The probability of being the acquiring firm in cross-border M&As is higher for 
firms in non-CFC rule countries compared to firms in CFC rule countries. 
This analysis is different to the analysis presented in Section 3, where we investigate whether 
CFC rules affect the decision to acquire a target if CFC rules are potentially applied to this 
target’s income. By analyzing the effect of CFC rules on the direction of cross-border M&As, 
we consider whether CFC rules negatively affect the choice of who becomes the parent of the 
newly created MNE. 
4.2 Empirical approach 
To analyze the direction of observed cross-border M&As, we assume that firm a acquires 
firm b and that a and b do not reside in the same country. Under the assumption that M&As 
reflect synergies from combining these two firms and that investors value the individual firms 
and the M&A correctly, it follows that the value when a acquires b (   ) is higher than the 
value when b acquires a (   ), i.e.,          . Based on Hypothesis 2 derived under 4.1, 
we argue that CFC rules have an impact on this valuation. In particular, CFC rules lead to a 
competitive disadvantage for parent firms as those firms have less profit shifting opportunities 
within their group and have to fear potential CFC rule application on low-tax subsidiaries’ 
income, at which these laws are aiming. We consider the following expression to analyze the 
direction in cross-border M&As, depending on the CFC rules of the two involved firms and 
given that we know that the transaction takes place: 
                          
               
                 
    (11) 
   
              
              
  
Using logit regression models, we aim to calculate             , i.e., we always consider 
the setting that a acquires b (          in expression (11)). This consideration implies 
that y, our dependent variable, always takes the value 1.
13
 The variable of interest is     , 
which measures the difference in CFC rules between a and b. We consider two approaches in 
calculating     . 
First, we construct a CFC dummy variable (∆CFC_dummy) that measures whether CFC rules 
are present in the residence countries of a and b. If, for example, the country of a does not 
                                                 
13
 The presented binary choice model is based on Huizinga and Voget (2009), pp. 1229ff. 
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apply CFC rules (0) and the country of b applies CFC rules (1) in the M&A year, 
∆CFC_dummy takes the value 0-1 = -1. 
Second, we consider individual characteristics of CFC rules to allow for more heterogeneity 
among CFC rules. We construct a CFC variable (∆CFC_value), which is zero for non-CFC 
rule countries and one for CFC rule countries. In addition to that, we consider the CFC rule 
countries in more detail and group them regarding their CFC rule harshness among the two 
main CFC rule features, which can be derived from all observed CFC rules: The lowest 
possible tax haven STR and the passive-to-active-income ratio accepted by CFC rules. This 
approach can increase ∆CFC_value up to the value 3. Among the CFC rule countries, the 
lowest possible tax haven STR is set to the tax rate threshold of the CFC rule.
14
 For CFC rule 
countries with a tax haven STR equal or above its median value of 15%, we add 1 to 
∆CFC_value. Similarly, we consider the passive-to-active-income ratio, which determines the 
amount of passive income that is allowed so that CFC rules are not triggered. The median 
value of the passive-to-active-income ratio is 10%; for CFC rule countries with a passive-to-
active-income ratio below 10%, we add 1 to ∆CFC_value.15 Table 1 provides one country 
example for each of the four categories of ∆CFC_value. 
Table 1. Country examples for the four categories of ∆CFC_value. 
∆CFC_value of 
country 
Exemplary country CFC rules? Tax rate 
threshold > 15%? 
Passive-to-active-
income ratio < 10%? 
0 Netherlands no n/a n/a 
1 China (from 2008) yes (since 2008) no (12.5%) no (50%) 
2 Korea, Rep. yes yes (15%) no (50%) 
3 Japan yes yes (20%) yes (no ratio) 
 
If, for example, a firm residing in the Netherlands acquires a firm residing in the Republic of 
Korea, ∆CFC_value takes the value 0-2 = -2. We expect a negative coefficient for both 
∆CFC_dummy and ∆CFC_value, indicating that it is more likely that the firm without CFC 
rules or with less harsh CFC rules becomes the acquiring firm. 
Following Huizinga and Voget (2009), we control for firm characteristics and macroeconomic 
conditions in the two countries captured by   . On the firm level, we include the firms’ 
consolidated financial data. We control for relative size of the two firms (∆Size) and expect a 
positive coefficient, as larger firms are considered more likely to acquire smaller firms. 
∆Leverage considers the difference in leverage ratio between the two firms. Following Desai 
and Hines (2002), we argue that firms with higher leverage have lower borrowing costs. Thus, 
these firms have higher borrowing capacity, which makes them more likely to be the acquirer. 
                                                 
14
 For EEA Member States in the years after the decision of the European Court of Justice in the case “Cadbury-
Schweppes” (C-194/04) in 2006, we set the tax haven tax rate equal to the lowest STR within the EU, because 
since this decision, CFC rules are de facto not applicable within the EU. In support of this reasoning, Ruf and 
Weichenrieder (2013) provide evidence for an increase of profit shifting within the EEA after this decision (see 
footnote 12). 
15
 These thresholds are subjective; however, they split the CFC rule countries into two equal halves and allow a 
grouping of the CFC rule countries according to their relative CFC rule harshness. 
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∆PTI measures the relative difference between pre-tax income of the two firms. Similar to our 
expectation of ∆Size, we expect that firms with higher profits are more likely to acquire firms 
with lower profits. 
On the country-level, we control for the difference in STRs (∆STR). We have no expectation 
on its coefficient as high-tax countries may have a better investment environment whereas 
low-tax country may attract firms due to tax savings. Based on the finding of Huizinga and 
Voget (2009) that taxation of dividend repatriation affects M&A direction, we include the 
difference in both countries’ double taxation avoidance method on foreign dividends (∆DTM), 
where 0 (1) stands for the credit (exemption) method. We expect a positive coefficient for this 
variable. We also include the two countries’ relative stock market size (∆StockMrk), which 
proxies for the relative ease to raise capital at stock markets and we expect a positive 
coefficient. In addition, we include the two countries’ relative difference between domestic 
credits granted to the private sector (∆CreditMrk). Similar to the argumentation in Section 
3.4.2, we argue that if a company is located in a country with a low ratio of credits granted to 
the private market, the supply of credit may be limited and, hence, the possibility to finance 
an acquisition via credit is limited. Thus, we expect a positive coefficient. Finally, to control 
for the price level in an economy, we include the difference in the inflation rate (∆Inflation) 
between both countries. We have a negative expectation on its coefficient. 
Further, we include country fixed effects that reflect whether the country is the acquirer or the 
target country: For each M&A, the acquirer country gets the value of 1 and the target country 
gets the value of -1; all other countries get the value of 0 for the respective M&A. 
Following Huizinga and Voget (2009), our logit regression is estimated using maximum 
likelihood estimation without a constant. The reason is straightforward: Since we always 
consider the setting that firm a acquires firm b (          in expression (11)), the 
dependent variable is always one and, consequently, there is no variation in the dependent 
variable and the constant would be a perfect fit. 
4.3 Data 
The M&A data analyzed in this section are the same as described in Section 3.3 with two 
exceptions. First, we relax the restriction to the 30 most frequent acquirer or target locations. 
Second, we require that the direct acquirer and the direct target reside in the same country as 
their respective ultimate parent to reduce the possibility of a subsidiary in a third country 
being involved in the M&A. In addition, as outlined above, we need consolidated financial 
data of both firms as control variables, which reduces our sample to 1,199 cross-border 
M&As involving 30 countries.
16
 Table 14 gives an overview over the number of acquirer 
                                                 
16
 We experience this sharp decrease in cross-border M&A observation due to the lack of important financial 
control variables. However, this decrease is not due to specific countries or a specific financial control variable. 
Hence, we assume that the smaller sub-sample is a representative subset of the larger one and that focusing on 
this subset does not bias our subsequent empirical work. This argumentation follows Huizinga and Voget (2009), 
p. 1228, who face the same problem using firm level data in an SDC data set and who observe a similar decrease 
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ultimate parents and target ultimate parents in this cross-border M&A sample per country. 
Further, this table provides information on whether CFC rules are implemented in those 
countries. 
4.4 Results 
Table 16 shows the results of the binary choice model to test Hypothesis 2 on the influence of 
CFC rules on the direction of cross-border M&As between two firms, i.e., which firm 
becomes the acquirer. For definitions, data sources and summary statistics of all variables see 
Table 15. 
In regressions (1) and (2), we find that CFC rules negatively affect the probability which firm 
becomes the acquirer. In particular, we find a significant coefficient at the 5% level for 
∆CFC_value. This finding suggests that when two firms perform a cross-border M&A, it is 
less likely that the firm with the harsher CFC rule becomes the acquiring firm. For the dummy 
variable approach (∆CFC_dummy), we observe a significantly negative coefficient at the 10% 
level. Hence, also the mere presence of CFC rules seems to affect cross-border M&A 
direction. These results prove to be robust in regressions (3) and (4), where we analyze a 
slightly smaller sample by considering only cross-border M&As directly between the ultimate 
parents, i.e., the acquirer is the acquirer ultimate parent and the target is the target ultimate 
parent. In regressions (5) and (6), we consider the same setting as in regressions (3) and (4), 
but exclude M&As that involve the United States. We do this to check that the results are not 
biased by potential check-the-box rule application in the US, which may allow for an escape 
from CFC rules for US MNEs under specific circumstances by using hybrid entities (e.g., 
Altshuler and Grubert (2006), Mutti and Grubert (2009)). Although this exclusion decreases 
the sample by more than half, we still observe a significantly negative estimate for 
∆CFC_dummy. The coefficient of ∆CFC_value remains also negative; however, its p-value 
drops to 19.4%. 
Taken together, we provide evidence for Hypothesis 2 that the direction of cross-border 
M&As between firms is negatively affected by the presence and harshness of CFC rules. This 
finding contributes to previous research documenting that headquarters relocation is 
influenced by CFC rules (Voget (2011)). Our interpretation of this finding is that if the non-
CFC rule firm acquirers the CFC rule firm, new profit shifting opportunities may potentially 
come up within the newly formed MNE, which may decrease the tax burden in the future. If 
the CFC rule firm acquires the non-CFC rule firm, these profit shifting opportunities are 
rather unattractive due to CFC rules in the new parent country. In addition, the CFC rule firm 
has to fear potential CFC rule application on low-tax subsidiaries’ income if such subsidiaries 
are already present in the acquired firm. The firms involved in the M&As are quite large with 
                                                                                                                                                        
in sample size. To expand our sub-sample, we follow Huizinga and Voget (2009) and use Compustat North 
America and Compustat Global databases that are together global in coverage to fill-up firm level control 
variables. We use CUSIP and SEDOL firm identification codes to link the Compustat databases with the SDC 
database. 
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an average value of total assets of the acquirers (targets) of 38.3 (2.4) bio. USD. Hence, it is 
reasonable to assume that at least some of the involved firms are already MNEs with 
implemented profit shifting strategies within their group if no CFC rules are present in the 
ultimate parent country. 
Regarding control variables, we find, as expected, that firm size has a significantly positive 
impact on the likelihood of being the acquiring firm and, in most regressions, firm 
profitability, firm leverage, STR and stock market size have a significantly positive effect on 
M&A direction. Credit market size has an unexpected negative effect in most regressions. We 
observe non-significant estimates for inflation rate and the method to avoid double taxation. 
5 Conclusion 
In this study, we investigate the impact of an increasingly important anti tax avoidance 
measure on cross-border M&A activity of corporations on a global scale. In particular, we 
consider important characteristics of CFC rules from a variety of countries and apply different 
logit regression models on a large worldwide cross-border M&A data set. Considering 
individual M&As, we find that the probability of being the acquirer of low-tax targets 
decreases if CFC rules may be applicable on this target’s income. This finding implies that 
acquirers from non-CFC rule countries have a competitive advantage in bidding for targets in 
low-tax countries. This is explained by a higher reservation price of these non-CFC rules 
acquirers due to potential firm value increasing profit shifting opportunities after the M&A. 
Further, we show that the acquirer’s location choice of a target is negatively affected if the 
target may fall under the scope of CFC rules of an acquirer. The reasoning behind this result 
is the same as before but the underlying perspective is different. Thereby, we find evidence 
that CFC rules affect M&A activity on the bidding side, i.e., non-CFC rule acquirers have 
competitive advantages in bidding for a given target, and on the target side, i.e., low-tax 
targets are rather acquired by non-CFC rule acquirers. These two findings provide robust 
evidence that CFC rules distort ownership of low-tax targets. Finally, we show that CFC rules 
negatively affect the direction of cross-border M&A, i.e., countries with CFC rules are less 
likely to attract parent firms in a newly created MNE after M&As. 
However, our results should not necessarily be interpreted as suggesting that countries should 
get rid of CFC rules. Moreover, our findings suggest that CFC rules seem to reach the 
intended goal of reducing profit shifting opportunities with low-tax subsidiaries in our cross 
border M&A context. In other words, our results suggest that the specific way of investing in 
foreign low-tax countries to shift profits afterwards is limited by existing CFC rules in the 
acquirer country. Therefore, CFC rules can be used by countries to counteract tax avoidance 
behavior of their MNEs, which could result in an increase in tax revenue on an overall scale. 
Nevertheless, the parallel presence and non-presence of CFC rules across countries is 
problematic from an economic perspective due to competitive disadvantages on the cross-
border M&A market and potentially tax-biased ownership structures on a global scale. 
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Thereby, we contribute to a strand of literature where little research has been undertaken so 
far. Further, our findings are particularly interesting in light of current tax policy 
developments. While the BEPS project of the OECD suggests an implementation of effective 
CFC rules in the OECD and G20 countries (OECD/G20 (2015)), the European Council even 
issued a legally binding directive requiring EU member states to implement CFC rules by 
2019 (European Council (2016)). In other words, at the latest from 2019 onwards, firms 
residing in the EU may face competitive disadvantages in M&A activities due to tax 
legislation, compared to firms residing in OECD and G20 member states, which do not follow 
the BEPS project’s suggestion to implement effective CFC rules and lower their MNEs’ tax 
avoidance opportunities. This finding indicates that more coordination regarding countries’ 
international tax law seems to be necessary if tax avoidance behavior of MNEs is considered 
unfavorable on a global scale and intended measures to counteract this behavior are supposed 
to be fruitful. 
  




Table 2. Cross-border M&A sample (2002-2014) for analyzing effect of acquirer CFC rules on probability of 













Australia 1 923 663 Japan 1 529 166 
Austria 0 125 73 Korea, Rep. 1 187 147 
Belarus n/a n/a 6 Latvia n/a n/a 2 
Belgium 0 154 186 Lithuania n/a n/a 14 
Bermuda n/a n/a 29 Malaysia 0 212 157 
Brazil n/a n/a 251 Malta n/a n/a 4 
British Virgin Islands n/a n/a 70 Mexico n/a n/a 197 
Bulgaria n/a n/a 30 Netherlands 0 421 355 
Canada 1 1,124 1,074 New Zealand 1 68 196 
Cayman Islands n/a n/a 17 Norway 1 296 144 
Chile n/a n/a 95 Panama n/a n/a 10 
China 1 338 846 Poland n/a n/a 140 
Croatia n/a n/a 20 Portugal n/a n/a 69 
Cyprus n/a n/a 16 Russian Federation 0 39 112 
Czech Republic n/a n/a 81 Seychelles n/a n/a 2 
Denmark 1 42 158 Singapore 0 490 271 
Estonia n/a n/a 12 Slovak Republic n/a n/a 16 
Finland 1 62 142 Slovenia n/a n/a 15 
France 1 644 667 South Africa n/a n/a 119 
Germany 1 622 842 Spain 1 324 360 
Greece n/a n/a 25 Sweden 1 71 369 
Hong Kong SAR, China 0 560 343 Switzerland 0 344 209 
Hungary n/a n/a 45 Taiwan, China n/a n/a 105 
Iceland n/a n/a 3 Turkey n/a n/a 79 
India 0 337 214 Ukraine n/a n/a 31 
Ireland 0 342 152 United Kingdom 1 1,670 1,772 
Israel 1 206 129 United States 1 4,020 2,857 
Italy 1 271 314 Total  14,421 14,421 
Table shows number of acquirer ultimate parents and targets per country in our cross-border M&A sample to 
investigate Hypothesis 1a. In this context, cross-border M&As are defined as acquirer ultimate parent and target 
residing in different countries; the direct acquirer and acquirer ultimate parent reside in the same country. CFC rule 
takes the value one, if the country has implemented CFC rules in 2014. 
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Table 3. Definition, data sources and summary statistics of variables for analyzing effect of acquirer CFC rules on probability of being acquirer country (Section 3.4.1). 
Variable Definition Data source Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
         Binary dummy variable coded one if target country STR is smaller than acquirer country’s tax rate 
threshold of CFC rule or acquirer country applies CFC rules without a tax rate threshold, and 0 
otherwise 
Tax guides 317,835 0.111 0.315 0 1 
        Difference between acquirer country STR and target country STR if target country STR is smaller than 
acquirer country’s tax rate threshold of CFC rule or acquirer country applies CFC rules without a tax 
rate threshold, and 0 otherwise 
Tax guides 317,835 0.012 0.043 0.000 0.409 
            Difference between acquirer country STR and target country STR if target country EATR is smaller 
than acquirer country’s tax rate threshold of the CFC rule or acquirer country applies CFC rules 
without a tax rate threshold, and 0 otherwise 
Tax guides; Oxford 
University Centre for 
Business Taxation 
317,835 0.011 0.039 -0.011 0.409 
           Same as        ; however, set to zero if acquirer and target country are both EEA Member States and 
M&A year is after 2006 
Tax guides 317,835 0.012 0.042 0.000 0.409 
Below See expression (6) Tax guides 317,835 0.012 0.043 0.000 0.409 
Above See expression (7) Tax guides 317,835 0.010 0.029 0.000 0.273 
Higher See expression (8) Tax guides 317,835 0.015 0.031 0.000 0.155 
           See expression (10) Tax guides 317,835 0.318 0.066 0.000 0.409 
              Same as        ; however, for non-profitable targets set to zero Tax guides; SDC; 
Compustat North America; 
Compustat Global 
55,715 0.007 0.034 0.000 0.395 
                   Same as        ; however, for profitable targets set to zero Tax guides; SDC; 
Compustat North America; 
Compustat Global 
55,715 0.003 0.021 0.000 0.409 
STR STR in candidate acquirer country, including typical local taxes Tax guides 317,835 0.291 0.071 0.125 0.409 
ExemptionMethod Binary dummy variable coded one if candidate acquirer country unilaterally applies the exemption 
method to avoid double taxation of foreign dividends, and 0 if it unilaterally applies the credit method  
Tax guides 294,697 0.606 0.489 0 1 
lnGDPpercapita GDP per capita in candidate acquirer country (natural logarithm) World Bank 317,835 10.416 0.620 7.942 11.284 
GDPgrowth Growth of GDP in candidate acquirer country (in %) World Bank 317,835 3.095 3.168 -7.821 15.240 
StockmarketSize Stock market capitalization of listed domestic companies in candidate acquirer country (in % of GDP) World Bank 317,835 121.5 175.6 15.767 1,254.5 
PrivateCredit Domestic credit to private sector in candidate acquirer country (in % of GDP) World Bank 317,835 115.3 39.525 31.081 233.4 
lnDistance Simple distance (in km) between most populated cities of candidate acquirer and target country 
(natural logarithm) 
Mayer and Zignago (2011) 317,835 8.498 1.100 4.088 9.883 
CommonLanguage Common language index between candidate acquirer and target country (0 (low similarity) to 1 (high 
similarity)) 
Melitz and Toubal (2014) 317,835 0.242 0.217 0.000 0.983 
ColonialRelationship Binary dummy variable coded one if candidate acquirer and target country were ever in a colonial 
relationship, and 0 otherwise 
Mayer and Zignago (2011) 317,835 0.095 0.294 0 1 
CommonLegalSystem Binary dummy variable coded one if legal system of candidate acquirer and target country have 
common legal origins, and 0 otherwise 
Head et al. (2010) 317,835 0.319 0.466 0 1 
TargetAssets Pre-deal consolidated target total assets in the last year before the effective M&A date (natural 
logarithm) 
SDC; Compustat North 
America; Compustat Global 
52,809 18.118 2.297 11.513 28.060 
TargetROA Pre-deal consolidated target pre-tax income in the last year before the effective M&A date divided by 
pre-deal consolidated target total assets in the last year before the effective M&A date 
SDC; Compustat North 
America; Compustat Global 
52,809 -0.036 0.844 -11.800 18.000 
TargetSales Pre-deal consolidated target net sales in the last year before the effective M&A date (natural logarithm) SDC; Compustat North 
America; Compustat Global 
78,495 17.667 2.320 6.908 26.216 
TargetEBITDA Pre-deal consolidated target EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) in 
the last year before the effective M&A date (natural logarithm) 
SDC; Compustat North 
America; Compustat Global 
34,405 16.369 2.093 7.601 24.300 
Data on country fixed effects are not reported but are available upon request. 
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Table 4. Effect of acquirer CFC rules on probability of being acquirer country (Section 3.4.1). 










         -0.0523
a
     
 (0.0407)     
         -1.4569*** -1.2387*** -1.2387**  
  (0.3277) (0.3482) (0.5606)  
Below     -2.5882*** 
     (0.4015) 
Above     -5.8277*** 
     (1.1959) 
Higher     -4.5472*** 
     (0.6634) 
STR -2.0538*** -1.7568*** -2.0903*** -2.0903** -1.9648*** 
 (0.6319) (0.6330) (0.6442) (0.8423) (0.7104) 
lnGDPpercapita 1.0541*** 1.0452*** 1.1104*** 1.1104*** 1.1838*** 
 (0.1619) (0.1625) (0.1652) (0.2118) (0.1710) 
GDPgrowth -0.0034 -0.0032 -0.0041 -0.0041 -0.0041 
 (0.0076) (0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0099) (0.0078) 
StockmarketSize 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005 0.0005*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
PrivateCredit 0.0007 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 0.0005 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0007) 
lnDistance -0.5852*** -0.5789*** -0.5906*** -0.5906*** -0.6185*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0119) (0.0217) (0.0128) 
CommonLanguage 1.8148*** 1.8112*** 1.8494*** 1.8494*** 1.9616*** 
 (0.0620) (0.0620) (0.0629) (0.1289) (0.0653) 
ColonialRelationship 0.3020*** 0.2868*** 0.2994*** 0.2994*** 0.3168*** 
 (0.0360) (0.0359) (0.0364) (0.0569) (0.0378) 
CommonLegalSystem 0.1029*** 0.1145*** 0.1117*** 0.1117** 0.1107*** 
 (0.0251) (0.0252) (0.0254) (0.0470) (0.0259) 
Acquirer country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 317,835 317,835 317,835 317,835 317,835 
Log-likelihood -32,188 -32,178 -32,165 -32,165 -32,091 
Regressions of probability of being the acquirer country on (potential) CFC rule application; see expression (3). For each deal, 
the dependent variable equals one if country i is the actual acquirer’s country of origin, and zero if country i is a counterfactual 
acquirer country. For variable definitions and data sources, see Table 3. Only cross-border M&As where the direct acquirer 
country is equal to the acquirer ultimate parent country are considered. All regressions control for acquirer country fixed 
effects, which are available upon request. The variables of interest follow a random distribution in the mixed logit regressions. 
Regressions (1) and (2) are estimated by a conditional logit model and regressions (3), (4) and (5) are estimated by a mixed 
logit model. Regression (4) is identical to regression (3) except for standard errors, which are robust to clustering on the target-
country-year level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard 
errors are provided in parentheses. 
a
 The level of statistical significance is 19.9%. 
 
27 / 44 
 
Table 5. Robustness tests of effect of acquirer CFC rules on probability of being acquirer country (Section 3.4.1). 





Using target effective 


















        -0.6035*    -1.2130*** -1.6977*** -1.0453* 
 (0.3472)    (0.3507) (0.3588) (0.5643) 
             -1.2961***      
  (0.3162)      
             -1.5406***     
   (0.3491)     
              -1.7810***    
    (0.3993)    
STR -2.3967*** -1.9075*** -1.9575*** -2.0217*** -2.1346*** -1.6298** -1.9436*** 
 (0.6431) (0.6363) (0.6440) (0.6433) (0.6472) (0.6774) (0.7260) 
ExemptionMethod 0.8440***       
 (0.0859)       
lnGDPpercapita 1.2497*** 1.0501*** 1.1225*** 1.1152*** 1.0906*** 1.1571*** 1.0672*** 
 (0.1661) (0.1621) (0.1655) (0.1653) (0.1666) (0.1680) (0.1805) 
GDPgrowth -0.0071 -0.0034 -0.0040 -0.0044 -0.0046 0.0051 -0.0106 
 (0.0077) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0077) (0.0085) (0.0086) 
StockmarketSize 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0003** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
PrivateCredit 0.0012* 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0006 0.0010 
 (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0010) 
lnDistance -0.5657*** -0.5890*** -0.5884*** -0.5948*** -0.5919*** -0.5696*** -0.6515*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0115) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0143) (0.0175) 
CommonLanguage 1.9151*** 1.8596*** 1.8491*** 1.8603*** 1.8598*** 1.9419*** 2.2097*** 
 (0.0641) (0.0625) (0.0630) (0.0631) (0.0627) (0.0676) (0.0770) 
ColonialRelationship 0.2454*** 0.3005*** 0.2971*** 0.3004*** 0.2937*** 0.2334*** 0.4303*** 
 (0.0370) (0.0360) (0.0364) (0.0365) (0.0371) (0.0388) (0.0475) 
CommonLegalSystem 0.0946*** 0.1030*** 0.1139*** 0.1136*** 0.1122*** 0.1244*** 0.1925*** 
 (0.0258) (0.0251) (0.0254) (0.0254) (0.0256) (0.0258) (0.0277) 
Acquirer country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 294,697 317,835 317,835 317,835 317,835 243,136 151,651 
Log-likelihood -30,936 -32,175 -32,164 -32,161 -32,164 -25,945 -19,203 
Regressions of probability of being the acquirer country on (potential) CFC rule application; see expression (3). For each deal, the dependent variable equals one if country i is the actual acquirer’s 
country of origin, and zero if country i is a counterfactual acquirer country. For variable definitions and data sources, see Table 3. Only cross-border M&As where the direct acquirer country is equal 
to the acquirer ultimate parent country are considered. All regressions control for acquirer country fixed effects, which are available upon request, and are estimated by a mixed logit model. The 
variables of interest follows a random distribution. Regression (1) additionally controls for double taxation avoidance method, regression (2), (3) and (4) check whether our variable of interest is 
robust to using effective average tax rates, considering potential non-application of CFC rules within the EEA and considering the included income by CFC rules. In regression (5), also STR follows a 
random distribution. Regressions (6) and (7) exclude certain countries. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are provided in 
parentheses. 
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Table 6. Further robustness tests of effect of acquirer CFC rules on probability of being acquirer country 
(Section 3.4.1). 










assets & target 







        -4.1258***  -3.1934*** -2.8136*** -2.1391* 
 (0.3294)  (1.1995) (0.7548) (1.2086) 
                -1.9250**    
  (0.9653)    
                    -5.5943***    
  (1.7488)    
STR  0.8489 0.4872 -0.6872 -0.5640 
  (1.5131) (1.5582) (1.2818) (1.8920) 
lnGDPpercapita  1.6639*** 1.8388*** 1.2574*** 1.1308** 
  (0.3762) (0.3851) (0.3246) (0.5062) 
GDPgrowth  0.0383** 0.0455** 0.0166 0.0272 
  (0.0195) (0.0202) (0.0176) (0.0258) 
StockmarketSize  0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0007 
  (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0006) 
PrivateCredit  0.0001 0.0003 -0.0010 -0.0008 
  (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0023) 
lnDistance  -0.5018*** -0.4904*** -0.4932*** -0.5148*** 
  (0.0313) (0.0338) (0.0266) (0.0422) 
CommonLanguage  1.7924*** 1.6550*** 1.5999*** 1.4257*** 
  (0.1765) (0.1951) (0.1562) (0.2360) 
ColonialRelationship  0.2783*** 0.2070** 0.1570** 0.1919* 
  (0.0862) (0.0921) (0.0731) (0.1080) 
CommonLegalSystem  0.2239*** 0.3270*** 0.3013*** 0.3555*** 
  (0.0654) (0.0713) (0.0560) (0.0860) 
Acquirer country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 317,835 55,715 52,809 78,495 34,405 
Log-likelihood -35,450 -5,495 -5,157 -7,715 -3,287 
Regressions of probability of being the acquirer country on (potential) CFC rule application; see expression (3). For 
each deal, the dependent variable equals one if country i is the actual acquirer’s country of origin, and zero if country 
i is a counterfactual acquirer country. For variable definitions and data sources, see Table 3. Only cross-border 
M&As where the direct acquirer country is equal to the acquirer ultimate parent country are considered. All 
regressions control for acquirer country fixed effects, which are available upon request, and are estimated by a mixed 
logit model. The variables of interest follow a random distribution. Regression (1) drops all control variables and 
regression (2) distinguishes between profitable and non-profitable targets. Regression (3) includes the interaction 
between acquirer country fixed effects and TargetAssets and the interaction between acquirer country fixed effects 
and TargetROA. Regression (4) includes the interaction between acquirer country fixed effects and TargetSales. 
Regression (5) includes the interaction between acquirer country fixed effects and TargetEBITDA. The coefficients 
and standard errors of these interactions are shown in Table 7. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
 
  
29 / 44 
 
Table 7. Supplemental regression results for candidate acquirer country fixed effects interacted with target-specific financial data. 
Regression (3) of Table 6 Regression (4) of Table 6 Regression (5) of Table 6 
Australia*TargetAssets -0.1275** Australia*TargetSales -0.1167*** Australia*TargetEBITDA -0.1229* 
 (0.0526)  (0.0417)  (0.0696) 
Austria*TargetAssets 0.0927 Austria*TargetSales 0.0242 Austria*TargetEBITDA 0.2592** 
 (0.0960)  (0.0851)  (0.1150) 
Belgium*TargetAssets 0.0394 Belgium*TargetSales -0.0256 Belgium*TargetEBITDA 0.0561 
 (0.0890)  (0.0693)  (0.1021) 
Canada*TargetAssets -0.1606*** Canada*TargetSales -0.1735*** Canada*TargetEBITDA -0.1486** 
 (0.0541)  (0.0380)  (0.0643) 
China*TargetAssets 0.0502 China*TargetSales -0.0781 China*TargetEBITDA -0.0301 
 (0.0579)  (0.0507)  (0.1096) 
Denmark*TargetAssets 0.0591 Denmark*TargetSales 0.0749 Denmark*TargetEBITDA 0.0275 
 (0.1467)  (0.1215)  (0.1813) 
Finland*TargetAssets -0.0130 Finland*TargetSales -0.1980*** Finland*TargetEBITDA 0.0561 
 (0.1863)  (0.0728)  (0.0490) 
France*TargetAssets 0.1841*** France*TargetSales 0.1561*** France*TargetEBITDA 0.1999*** 
 (0.0477)  (0.0420)  (0.0603) 
Germany*TargetAssets 0.1779*** Germany*TargetSales 0.1239*** Germany*TargetEBITDA 0.2245*** 
 (0.0482)  (0.0479)  (0.0636) 
HongKongSARChina*TargetAssets -0.0375 HongKongSARChina*TargetSales -0.0809* HongKongSARChina*TargetEBITDA -0.0597 
 (0.0544)  (0.0477)  (0.0725) 
India*TargetAssets -0.1437** India*TargetSales -0.0593 India*TargetEBITDA -0.3182*** 
 (0.0591)  (0.0369)  (0.0755) 
Ireland*TargetAssets -0.1022** Ireland*TargetSales -0.0565 Ireland*TargetEBITDA -0.1737** 
 (0.0504)  (0.0410)  (0.0714) 
Israel*TargetAssets -0.0013 Israel*TargetSales -0.0859 Israel*TargetEBITDA 0.0781 
 (0.0810)  (0.0572)  (0.1288) 
Italy*TargetAssets 0.0162 Italy*TargetSales 0.0067 Italy*TargetEBITDA 0.0309 
 (0.0585)  (0.0457)  (0.0794) 
Japan*TargetAssets 0.1112** Japan*TargetSales 0.1007** Japan*TargetEBITDA 0.0818 
 (0.0461)  (0.0404)  (0.0696) 
KoreaRep*TargetAssets 0.0875 KoreaRep*TargetSales -0.0338 KoreaRep*TargetEBITDA 0.2206 
 (0.1026)  (0.0893)  (0.2751) 
Malaysia*TargetAssets -0.1075 Malaysia*TargetSales -0.1171* Malaysia*TargetEBITDA -0.2086 
 (0.1090)  (0.0707)  (0.1310) 
Netherlands*TargetAssets 0.1765*** Netherlands*TargetSales 0.0893* Netherlands*TargetEBITDA 0.1696** 
 (0.0504)  (0.0458)  (0.0699) 
NewZealand*TargetAssets -0.0111 NewZealand*TargetSales 0.2038** NewZealand*TargetEBITDA -0.1343 
 (0.1395)  (0.0951)  (0.1243) 
Norway*TargetAssets -0.2134*** Norway*TargetSales -0.1773*** Norway*TargetEBITDA -0.2307** 
 (0.0732)  (0.0423)  (0.1167) 
RussianFederation*TargetAssets 0.0481 RussianFederation*TargetSales -0.1325 RussianFederation*TargetEBITDA 0.2715 
 (0.2429)  (0.1597)  (0.1787) 
Singapore*TargetAssets -0.0009 Singapore*TargetSales -0.0877 Singapore*TargetEBITDA -0.0784 
 (0.0640)  (0.0580)  (0.0812) 
Spain*TargetAssets 0.2229*** Spain*TargetSales 0.1261** Spain*TargetEBITDA 0.1338 
 (0.0759)  (0.0589)  (0.0972) 
Sweden*TargetAssets 0.3177*** Sweden*TargetSales -0.0665 Sweden*TargetEBITDA 0.0543 
 (0.1215)  (0.0901)  (0.1561) 
Switzerland*TargetAssets 0.1798*** Switzerland*TargetSales 0.0347 Switzerland*TargetEBITDA 0.1748** 
 (0.0563)  (0.0557)  (0.0872) 
UnitedKingdom*TargetAssets -0.0638 UnitedKingdom*TargetSales -0.1709*** UnitedKingdom*TargetEBITDA -0.0150 
 (0.0475)  (0.0314)  (0.0577) 
Australia*TargetROA 0.0451     
 (0.1562)     
Austria*TargetROA -0.3821**     
 (0.1873)     
Belgium*TargetROA 0.0782     
 (0.3381)     
Canada*TargetROA 0.0885     
 (0.2366)     
China*TargetROA -0.3323**     
 (0.1653)     
Denmark*TargetROA 0.3034     
 (0.2514)     
Finland*TargetROA 0.4007**     
 (0.1818)     
France*TargetROA 0.1699     
 (0.1596)     
Germany*TargetROA -0.3493**     
 (0.1597)     
HongKongSARChina*TargetROA 0.0771     
 (0.1329)     
India*TargetROA 0.0564     
 (0.1776)     
Ireland*TargetROA 0.2417*     
 (0.1374)     
Israel*TargetROA -0.3429**     
 (0.1377)     
Italy*TargetROA -0.1279     
 (0.1952)     
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Japan*TargetROA 0.4780***     
 (0.1482)     
KoreaRep*TargetROA -0.3778**     
 (0.1693)     
Malaysia*TargetROA 0.1243     
 (0.1701)     
Netherlands*TargetROA 0.3409     
 (0.2256)     
NewZealand*TargetROA 0.3107**     
 (0.1298)     
Norway*TargetROA -0.0062     
 (0.1873)     
RussianFederation*TargetROA 0.1880     
 (0.3663)     
Singapore*TargetROA -0.2435*     
 (0.1407)     
Spain*TargetROA 0.1719     
 (0.2793)     
Sweden*TargetROA 7.1903**     
 (3.2794)     
Switzerland*TargetROA -0.2943*     
 (0.1715)     
UnitedKingdom*TargetROA 0.2905**     
 (0.1420)     
Table reports supplemental results of regressions (3), (4) and (5) of Table 6. In particular, the coefficient of the interaction between candidate acquirer country fixed 
effects with target-specific consolidated financial data (target total assets, target return on assets, target net sales and target earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization) are shown. In all regressions, the US represent the base category *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
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Table 8. Cross-border M&A sample (2002-2014) for analyzing effect of acquirer CFC rules on probability of 













Australia 1 712 801 Japan 1 431 170 
Austria 0 77 n/a Korea, Rep. 1 162 153 
Belarus 0 1 n/a Lithuania 1 5 n/a 
Belgium 0 123 197 Malaysia 0 178 174 
Bermuda 0 56 n/a Malta 0 5 n/a 
Brazil 1 40 320 Mexico 1 54 270 
British Virgin Islands 0 28 n/a Netherlands 0 296 404 
Bulgaria 0 1 n/a New Zealand 1 92 141 
Canada 1 1,824 594 Norway 1 130 260 
Cayman Islands 0 17 n/a Panama 0 5 n/a 
Chile 0 19 n/a Poland 0 25 170 
China 1 271 897 Portugal 1 35 n/a 
Croatia 0 1 n/a Russian Federation 0 51 82 
Cyprus 0 35 n/a Seychelles 0 7 n/a 
Czech Republic 0 7 n/a Singapore 0 416 290 
Denmark 1 118 35 Slovak Republic 0 2 n/a 
Estonia 0 1 n/a Slovenia 0 5 n/a 
Finland 1 112 44 South Africa 1 58 156 
France 1 490 708 Spain 1 239 369 
Germany 1 433 951 Sweden 1 365 n/a 
Greece 1 17 n/a Switzerland 0 268 240 
Hong Kong SAR, China 0 487 377 Taiwan, China 0 90 n/a 
Hungary 1 7 n/a Turkey 1 17 n/a 
Iceland 1 38 n/a Ukraine 0 8 n/a 
India 0 295 227 United Kingdom 1 2,023 1,084 
Ireland 0 253 181 United States 1 2,647 3,818 
Israel 1 172 n/a     
Italy 1 198 334 Total  13,447 13,447 
Table shows number of acquirer ultimate parents and targets per country in our cross-border M&A sample to 
investigate Hypothesis 1b. In this context, cross-border M&As are defined as acquirer ultimate parent and target 
residing in different countries; the direct acquirer and acquirer ultimate parent reside in the same country. CFC rule 
takes the value one, if the country has implemented CFC rules in 2014. 
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Table 9. Definition, data sources and summary statistics of variables for analyzing effect of acquirer CFC rules on probability of being target country (Section 3.4.2). 
Variable Definition Data source Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
         Binary dummy variable coded one if target country STR is smaller than acquirer country’s tax rate threshold 
of CFC rule or acquirer country applies CFC rules without a tax rate threshold, and 0 otherwise 
Tax guides 317,444 0.345 0.475 0 1 
        Difference between acquirer country STR and target country STR if target country STR is smaller than 
acquirer country’s tax rate threshold of CFC rule or acquirer country applies CFC rules without a tax rate 
threshold, and 0 otherwise 
Tax guides 317,444 0.037 0.063 0.000 0.284 
            Difference between acquirer country STR and target country STR if target country EATR is smaller than 
acquirer country’s tax rate threshold of the CFC rule or acquirer country applies CFC rules without a tax rate 
threshold, and 0 otherwise 
Tax guides; Oxford 
University Centre for 
Business Taxation 
317,444 0.031 0.057 -0.033 0.284 
           Same as        ; however, set to zero if acquirer and target country are both EEA Member States and M&A 
year is after 2006 
Tax guides 317,444 0.035 0.062 0.000 0.284 
Below See expression (6) Tax guides 317,444 0.037 0.063 0.000 0.284 
Above See expression (7) Tax guides 317,444 0.008 0.026 0.000 0.258 
Higher See expression (8) Tax guides 317,444 0.014 0.030 0.000 0.259 
           See expression (10) Tax guides 317,444 0.305 0.058 0.125 0.409 
               Same as        ; however, for non-profitable targets set to zero Tax guides; SDC; 
Compustat North America; 
Compustat Global 
53,270 0.026 0.057 0.000 0.284 
                   Same as        ; however, for profitable targets set to zero Tax guides; SDC; 
Compustat North America; 
Compustat Global 
53,270 0.013 0.042 0.000 0.277 
STR STR in candidate target country, including typical local taxes Tax guides 317,444 0.287 0.071 0.125 0.409 
lnGDPpercapita GDP per capita in candidate target country (natural logarithm) World Bank 317,444 10.267 0.687 7.942 11.284 
GDPgrowth Growth of GDP in candidate target country (in %) World Bank 317,444 3.221 3.206 -7.821 15.240 
StockmarketSize Stock market capitalization of listed domestic companies in candidate target country (in % of GDP) World Bank 317,444 124.1 178.4 17.020 1,254.5 
PrivateCredit Domestic credit to private sector in candidate target country (in % of GDP) World Bank 317,444 109.5 47.091 13.353 233.4 
lnDistance Simple distance (in km) between most populated cities of acquirer and candidate target country (natural 
logarithm) 
Mayer and Zignago (2011) 317,444 8.609 1.046 5.153 9.883 
CommonLanguage Common language index between acquirer and candidate target country (0 (low similarity) to 1 (high 
similarity)) 
Melitz and Toubal (2014) 317,444 0.235 0.212 0.000 0.991 
ColonialRelationship Binary dummy variable coded one if acquirer and candidate target country were ever in a colonial 
relationship, and 0 otherwise 
Mayer and Zignago (2011) 317,444 0.103 0.304 0 1 
CommonLegalSystem Binary dummy variable coded one if legal system of acquirer and candidate target country have common 
legal origins, and 0 otherwise 
Head et al. (2010) 317,444 0.329 0.470 0 1 
CorruptionControl Corruption control index of candidate target country (-3 (low control) to 3 (high control)) World Bank 317,444 1.072 0.976 -1.088 2.527 
BusinessStartupCost Cost of business start-up procedures in candidate target country (in % of GNI per capita) World Bank 317,444 9.601 12.746 0.000 78.400 
UnemploymentRate Unemployment rate in candidate target country (in % of total labor force) World Bank 317,444 7.031 5.050 2.493 27.140 
lnDomesticFirms Number of listed domestic companies in candidate target country (natural logarithm) World Bank 317,444 6.426 1.232 3.714 8.638 
BusinessDisclosure Business extent of disclosure index of in candidate target country (0 (less disclosure) to 10 (more disclosure)) World Bank 264,159 7.188 2.344 0 10 
AcquirerAssets Pre-deal consolidated acquirer total assets in the last year before the effective M&A date (natural logarithm) SDC; Compustat North 
America; Compustat Global 
215,197 20.280 2.808 11.513 28.710 
AcquirerROA Pre-deal consolidated acquirer pre-tax income in the last year before the effective M&A date divided by pre-
deal consolidated acquirer total assets in the last year before the effective M&A date 
SDC; Compustat North 
America; Compustat Global 
215,197 0.035 5.999 -191.9 360.5 
AcquirerSales Pre-deal consolidated acquirer net sales in the last year before the effective M&A date (natural logarithm) SDC; Compustat North 
America; Compustat Global 
206,176 19.979 2.732 8.219 26.834 
AcquirerEBITDA Pre-deal consolidated acquirer EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) in the 
last year before the effective M&A date (natural logarithm) 
SDC; Compustat North 
America; Compustat Global 
180,202 18.594 2.365 9.210 24.723 
Data on country fixed effects are not reported but are available upon request. 
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Table 10. Effect of acquirer CFC rules on probability of being target country (Section 3.4.2). 










         -0.1078**     
 (0.0450)     
         -1.7115*** -2.8880*** -2.8880***  
  (0.3921) (0.5306) (0.8075)  
Below     -4.7124*** 
     (0.5975) 
Above     -8.6127*** 
     (1.0042) 
Higher     -1.1460** 
     (0.5413) 
STR 2.6019*** 2.4139*** 2.0753*** 2.0753** 1.6429** 
 (0.6293) (0.6309) (0.6398) (0.8535) (0.6891) 
lnGDPpercapita -0.0639 -0.0388 -0.0848 -0.0848 -0.1192 
 (0.1740) (0.1739) (0.1744) (0.3059) (0.1788) 
GDPgrowth 0.0142* 0.0143* 0.0134* 0.0134 0.0128 
 (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0112) (0.0082) 
StockmarketSize -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
PrivateCredit -0.0019** -0.0019** -0.0021*** -0.0021** -0.0022*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0008) 
lnDistance -0.5799*** -0.5740*** -0.5736*** -0.5736*** -0.5934*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0188) (0.0123) 
CommonLanguage 1.9043*** 1.9006*** 1.9162*** 1.9162*** 1.9734*** 
 (0.0639) (0.0638) (0.0641) (0.1225) (0.0671) 
ColonialRelationship 0.2992*** 0.2777*** 0.2712*** 0.2712*** 0.2252*** 
 (0.0375) (0.0377) (0.0378) (0.0489) (0.0387) 
CommonLegalSystem 0.0172 0.0311 0.0345 0.0345 0.0672** 
 (0.0269) (0.0271) (0.0272) (0.0483) (0.0278) 
CorruptionControl 0.1651* 0.1644* 0.1600* 0.1600 0.1542* 
 (0.0859) (0.0860) (0.0863) (0.1337) (0.0884) 
BusinessStartupCost -0.0073** -0.0072** -0.0075** -0.0075* -0.0069** 
 (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0044) (0.0033) 
UnemploymentRate -0.0004 0.0001 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0002 
 (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0085) (0.0065) 
lnDomesticFirms 0.1775** 0.1651* 0.1834** 0.1834 0.2095** 
 (0.0848) (0.0846) (0.0848) (0.1338) (0.0853) 
Target country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 317,444 317,444 317,444 317,444 317,444 
Log-likelihood -31,158 -31,151 -31,144 -31,144 -31,064 
Regressions of probability of being the target country on (potential) CFC rule application in acquirer country; see 
expression (3). For each deal, the dependent variable equals one if country i is the actual target’s country of origin, and 
zero if country i is a counterfactual target country. For variable definitions and data sources, see Table 9. Only cross-
border M&As where the direct acquirer country is equal to the acquirer ultimate parent country are considered. All 
regressions control for target country fixed effects, which are available upon request. The variables of interest follow a 
random distribution in the mixed logit regressions. Regressions (1) and (2) are estimated by a conditional logit model 
and regressions (3), (4) and (5) are estimated by a mixed logit model. Regression (4) is identical to regression (3) 
except for standard errors, which are robust to clustering on the acquirer-country-year level. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
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Table 11. Robustness tests of effect of acquirer CFC rules on probability of being target country (Section 3.4.2). 



























           -2.9635*** -3.0176*** -1.9885*** -2.1462*** 
    (0.5612) (0.5315) (0.6091) (0.5646) 
            -1.6836***       
 (0.4775)       
            -3.2489***      
  (0.5360)      
             -1.3819
a
     
   (0.9350)     
STR 2.3923*** 1.9682*** 3.8860*** 1.8021*** 2.2549*** -0.7337 1.8860** 
 (0.6354) (0.6407) (1.0668) (0.6577) (0.6744) (0.9266) (0.7650) 
lnGDPpercapita -0.0710 -0.0803 -0.1884 -0.3431* 0.0169 -0.5203*** 0.3354 
 (0.1744) (0.1749) (0.1798) (0.1848) (0.1825) (0.1978) (0.2291) 
GDPgrowth 0.0139* 0.0137* 0.0140* 0.0119 0.0109 0.0186** 0.0204** 
 (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0082) (0.0083) (0.0087) (0.0093) (0.0087) 
StockmarketSize -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
PrivateCredit -0.0020** -0.0022*** -0.0018** -0.0022*** -0.0029*** -0.0034*** -0.0025*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0009) 
lnDistance -0.5834*** -0.5712*** -0.5919*** -0.5985*** -0.5562*** -0.6799*** -0.5717*** 
 (0.0113) (0.0115) (0.0122) (0.0125) (0.0145) (0.0166) (0.0123) 
CommonLanguage 1.9332*** 1.9217*** 1.9710*** 2.0260*** 1.9892*** 2.0413*** 1.9405*** 
 (0.0639) (0.0640) (0.0670) (0.0684) (0.0685) (0.0805) (0.0687) 
ColonialRelationship 0.2986*** 0.2636*** 0.2760*** 0.2637*** 0.2214*** 0.3984*** 0.2497*** 
 (0.0377) (0.0378) (0.0384) (0.0387) (0.0403) (0.0485) (0.0413) 
CommonLegalSystem 0.0139 0.0364 0.0282 0.0315 0.0482* 0.0919*** 0.0162 
 (0.0269) (0.0272) (0.0278) (0.0280) (0.0278) (0.0341) (0.0291) 
CorruptionControl 0.1784** 0.1504* 0.1641* 0.1525* 0.1277 0.0777 0.3170*** 
 (0.0860) (0.0865) (0.0875) (0.0889) (0.0922) (0.1113) (0.1135) 
BusinessStartupCost -0.0074** -0.0074** -0.0076** -0.0081** -0.0052 -0.0071* -0.0064* 
 (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0036) 
UnemploymentRate 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0026 -0.0032 0.0033 -0.0134* 0.0055 
 (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0067) (0.0081) (0.0071) 
lnDomesticFirms 0.1715** 0.1794** 0.2252*** 0.2844*** 0.2078** 0.2547*** 0.0623 
 (0.0848) (0.0849) (0.0861) (0.0876) (0.0883) (0.0907) (0.1015) 
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BusinessDisclosure       0.0820 
       (0.0686) 
Target country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 317,444 317,444 317,444 317,444 255,172 161,910 264,159 
Log-likelihood -31,155 -31,140 -31,136 -31,119 -26,594 -19,327 -26,172 
Regressions of probability of being the target country on (potential) CFC rule application in acquirer country; see expression (3). For each deal, the dependent 
variable equals one if country i is the actual target’s country of origin, and zero if country i is a counterfactual target country. For variable definitions and data 
sources, see Table 9. Only cross-border M&As where the direct acquirer country is equal to the acquirer ultimate parent country are considered. All regressions 
control for target country fixed effects, which are available upon request, and are estimated by a mixed logit model. The variables of interest follow a random 
distribution in the mixed logit regressions. Regression (1), (2) and (3) check whether our variable of interest is robust to using effective average tax rates, 
considering potential non-application of CFC rules within the EEA and considering the included income by CFC rules. In regression (4), also STR follows a 
random distribution. Regressions (5) and (6) exclude certain countries and regression (7) considers a further control variable (BusinessDisclosure). *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
a
 The level of statistical significance is 13.9%. 
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Table 12. Further robustness tests of effect of acquirer CFC rules on probability of being target country (Section 3.4.2). 









assets & acquirer 







        -6.4155***  -3.5409*** -3.4268*** -3.2957*** 
 (0.4292)  (0.6830) (0.6655) (0.7050) 
                -6.4673***    
  (1.6700)    
                    -7.2323***    
  (1.9287)    
STR  -1.8795 2.4216*** 2.7097*** 2.7031*** 
  (1.7514) (0.7889) (0.7979) (0.8450) 
lnGDPpercapita  0.2851 -0.1952 -0.0804 -0.3150 
  (0.5944) (0.2289) (0.2319) (0.2494) 
GDPgrowth  -0.0329 0.0119 0.0107 0.0096 
  (0.0227) (0.0101) (0.0104) (0.0111) 
StockmarketSize  -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0000 
  (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
PrivateCredit  -0.0050*** -0.0027*** -0.0029*** -0.0026** 
  (0.0018) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) 
lnDistance  -0.4524*** -0.5450*** -0.5504*** -0.5388*** 
  (0.0303) (0.0145) (0.0152) (0.0162) 
CommonLanguage  2.0888*** 1.6471*** 1.5955*** 1.4247*** 
  (0.1776) (0.0896) (0.0895) (0.1006) 
ColonialRelationship  0.2331*** 0.2761*** 0.2821*** 0.2991*** 
  (0.0901) (0.0462) (0.0468) (0.0489) 
CommonLegalSystem  0.1076 0.1376*** 0.1668*** 0.2000*** 
  (0.0681) (0.0363) (0.0363) (0.0388) 
CorruptionControl  0.0070 0.1240 0.0248 0.0192 
  (0.2145) (0.1076) (0.1088) (0.1168) 
BusinessStartupCost  -0.0087 -0.0122*** -0.0110*** -0.0091** 
  (0.0089) (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0046) 
UnemploymentRate  -0.0252 -0.0091 -0.0124 -0.0128 
  (0.0160) (0.0081) (0.0082) (0.0087) 
lnDomesticFirms  0.4353* 0.1074 0.0945 0.1462 
  (0.2224) (0.1060) (0.1069) (0.1119) 
Target country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 317,444 53,270 215,197 206,176 180,202 
Log-likelihood -34,219 -5,028 -20,617 -19,818 -17,463 
Regressions of probability of being the target country on (potential) CFC rule application in acquirer country; see expression 
(3). For each deal, the dependent variable equals one if country i is the actual target’s country of origin, and zero if country i is 
a counterfactual target country. For variable definitions and data sources, see Table 9. Only cross-border M&As where the 
direct acquirer country is equal to the acquirer ultimate parent country are considered. All regressions control for target country 
fixed effects, which are available upon request, and are estimated by a mixed logit model. The variables of interest follow a 
random distribution in the mixed logit regressions. Regression (1) drops all control variables and regression (2) distinguishes 
between profitable and non-profitable targets. Regression (3) includes the interaction between target country fixed effects and 
AcquirerAssets and the interaction between target country fixed effects and AcquirerROA. Regression (4) includes the 
interaction between target country fixed effects and AcquirerSales. Regression (5) includes the interaction between target 
country fixed effects and AcquirerEBITDA. The coefficients and standard errors of these interactions are shown in Table 13. *, 
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Table 13. Supplemental regression results for candidate target country fixed effects interacted with acquirer-specific financial data. 
Regression (3) of Table 12 Regression (4) of Table 12 Regression (5) of Table 12 
Australia*AcquirerAssets -0.0867*** Australia*AcquirerSales -0.0542*** Australia*AcquirerEBITDA -0.0819*** 
 (0.0194)  (0.0199)  (0.0230) 
Belgium*AcquirerAssets -0.0737** Belgium*AcquirerSales -0.0633** Belgium*AcquirerEBITDA -0.1133*** 
 (0.0302)  (0.0301)  (0.0389) 
Brazil*AcquirerAssets 0.0321 Brazil*AcquirerSales 0.1174*** Brazil*AcquirerEBITDA 0.1288*** 
 (0.0301)  (0.0373)  (0.0361) 
Canada*AcquirerAssets -0.1900*** Canada*AcquirerSales -0.1707*** Canada*AcquirerEBITDA -0.1391*** 
 (0.0244)  (0.0245)  (0.0298) 
China*AcquirerAssets -0.1894*** China*AcquirerSales -0.1697*** China*AcquirerEBITDA -0.1784*** 
 (0.0212)  (0.0201)  (0.0279) 
Denmark*AcquirerAssets -0.0393 Denmark*AcquirerSales -0.0148 Denmark*AcquirerEBITDA -0.0599 
 (0.0754)  (0.0855)  (0.0968) 
Finland*AcquirerAssets -0.0406 Finland*AcquirerSales 0.0486 Finland*AcquirerEBITDA -0.1441 
 (0.0725)  (0.0660)  (0.1023) 
France*AcquirerAssets -0.0699*** France*AcquirerSales -0.0638*** France*AcquirerEBITDA -0.1531*** 
 (0.0168)  (0.0174)  (0.0216) 
Germany*AcquirerAssets -0.0929*** Germany*AcquirerSales -0.0944*** Germany*AcquirerEBITDA -0.1481*** 
 (0.0156)  (0.0160)  (0.0196) 
HongKongSARChina*AcquirerAssets -0.2496*** HongKongSARChina*AcquirerSales -0.2166*** HongKongSARChina*AcquirerEBITDA -0.2576*** 
 (0.0345)  (0.0277)  (0.0399) 
India*AcquirerAssets 0.0178 India*AcquirerSales 0.0684* India*AcquirerEBITDA 0.0444 
 (0.0334)  (0.0371)  (0.0420) 
Ireland*AcquirerAssets -0.0215 Ireland*AcquirerSales -0.0067 Ireland*AcquirerEBITDA -0.0489 
 (0.0349)  (0.0344)  (0.0421) 
Italy*AcquirerAssets 0.0233 Italy*AcquirerSales 0.0241 Italy*AcquirerEBITDA -0.0159 
 (0.0291)  (0.0300)  (0.0359) 
Japan*AcquirerAssets 0.0125 Japan*AcquirerSales -0.0390 Japan*AcquirerEBITDA -0.0462 
 (0.0403)  (0.0456)  (0.0554) 
KoreaRep*AcquirerAssets 0.0294 KoreaRep*AcquirerSales 0.0095 KoreaRep*AcquirerEBITDA 0.0552 
 (0.0504)  (0.0494)  (0.0542) 
Malaysia*AcquirerAssets -0.2115*** Malaysia*AcquirerSales -0.1429*** Malaysia*AcquirerEBITDA -0.2109*** 
 (0.0426)  (0.0421)  (0.0558) 
Mexico*AcquirerAssets -0.3658*** Mexico*AcquirerSales -0.1508*** Mexico*AcquirerEBITDA -0.0526 
 (0.0316)  (0.0437)  (0.0550) 
Netherlands*AcquirerAssets -0.0799*** Netherlands*AcquirerSales -0.0567*** Netherlands*AcquirerEBITDA -0.1291*** 
 (0.0209)  (0.0215)  (0.0259) 
NewZealand*AcquirerAssets -0.1727*** NewZealand*AcquirerSales -0.1197*** NewZealand*AcquirerEBITDA -0.3288*** 
 (0.0307)  (0.0266)  (0.0381) 
Norway*AcquirerAssets -0.1155*** Norway*AcquirerSales -0.0915*** Norway*AcquirerEBITDA -0.1021*** 
 (0.0273)  (0.0262)  (0.0340) 
Poland*AcquirerAssets -0.0356 Poland*AcquirerSales -0.0602 Poland*AcquirerEBITDA -0.0928* 
 (0.0452)  (0.0441)  (0.0500) 
RussianFederation*AcquirerAssets -0.0841 RussianFederation*AcquirerSales -0.1421** RussianFederation*AcquirerEBITDA -0.0242 
 (0.0558)  (0.0607)  (0.0884) 
Singapore*AcquirerAssets -0.1589*** Singapore*AcquirerSales -0.1096*** Singapore*AcquirerEBITDA -0.1836*** 
 (0.0315)  (0.0268)  (0.0356) 
SouthAfrica*AcquirerAssets -0.1952*** SouthAfrica*AcquirerSales -0.1524*** SouthAfrica*AcquirerEBITDA -0.1421*** 
 (0.0376)  (0.0371)  (0.0543) 
Spain*AcquirerAssets -0.0371 Spain*AcquirerSales -0.0328 Spain*AcquirerEBITDA -0.0454 
 (0.0317)  (0.0312)  (0.0358) 
Switzerland*AcquirerAssets -0.0841*** Switzerland*AcquirerSales -0.0741*** Switzerland*AcquirerEBITDA -0.0619* 
 (0.0264)  (0.0285)  (0.0350) 
UnitedKingdom*AcquirerAssets -0.0884*** UnitedKingdom*AcquirerSales -0.0762*** UnitedKingdom*AcquirerEBITDA -0.1113*** 
 (0.0174)  (0.0179)  (0.0214) 
Australia*AcquirerROA -0.0370     
 (0.0295)     
Belgium*AcquirerROA 0.0158***     
 (0.0057)     
Brazil*AcquirerROA -0.0375     
 (0.0277)     
Canada*AcquirerROA -0.0413     
 (0.0390)     
China*AcquirerROA -0.0043     
 (0.0112)     
Denmark*AcquirerROA 0.0424     
 (0.5075)     
Finland*AcquirerROA -0.1937     
 (0.1496)     
France*AcquirerROA 0.0021     
 (0.0058)     
Germany*AcquirerROA 0.0108**     
 (0.0053)     
HongKongSARChina*AcquirerROA -0.0648*     
 (0.0355)     
India*AcquirerROA -0.0484     
 (0.0374)     
Ireland*AcquirerROA -0.0134     
 (0.0453)     
Italy*AcquirerROA -0.0068     
 (0.0254)     
Japan*AcquirerROA -0.0642*     
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 (0.0346)     
KoreaRep*AcquirerROA -0.0577*     
 (0.0337)     
Malaysia*AcquirerROA 0.0007     
 (0.0079)     
Mexico*AcquirerROA -0.0010     
 (0.0081)     
Netherlands*AcquirerROA -0.0154     
 (0.0531)     
NewZealand*AcquirerROA 0.0195     
 (0.0137)     
Norway*AcquirerROA -0.0151     
 (0.0344)     
Poland*AcquirerROA -0.0394     
 (0.0410)     
RussianFederation*AcquirerROA -0.0564*     
 (0.0339)     
Singapore*AcquirerROA -0.0539     
 (0.0349)     
SouthAfrica*AcquirerROA 0.0006     
 (0.0076)     
Spain*AcquirerROA -0.0365     
 (0.0386)     
Switzerland*AcquirerROA 0.0027     
 (0.0058)     
UnitedKingdom*AcquirerROA -0.0098     
 (0.0196)     
Table reports supplemental results of regressions (3), (4) and (5) of Table 12. In particular, the coefficient of the interaction between candidate target country fixed 
effects with acquirer-specific consolidated financial data (acquirer total assets, acquirer return on assets, acquirer net sales and acquirer earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization) are shown. In all regressions, the US represent the base category *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
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Table 14. Cross-border M&A sample (2002-2014) for analyzing effect of CFC rules on direction 













Australia 1 43 57 Luxembourg 0 3 6 
Austria 0 7 3 Mexico 1 7 5 
Belgium 0 21 27 Netherlands 0 41 19 
Brazil 1 3 24 New Zealand 1 4 4 
Canada 1 70 101 Norway 1 9 24 
Chile 0 2 6 Poland 0 1 5 
China 1 14 6 Portugal 1 2 1 
Denmark 1 7 9 Russian Federation 0 6 2 
France 1 64 83 South Africa 1 20 10 
Germany 1 55 65 Spain 1 29 40 
India 0 32 12 Sweden 1 5 5 
Ireland 0 32 14 Switzerland 0 40 18 
Israel 1 21 16 United Kingdom 1 156 338 
Italy 1 30 21 United States 1 411 260 
Japan 1 55 9     
Korea, Rep. 1 9 9 Total  1,199 1,199 
Table shows number of acquirer ultimate parents and targets ultimate parents per country in our cross-
border M&A sample to investigate Hypothesis 2. In this context, cross-border M&As are defined as 
acquirer ultimate parent and target ultimate parent residing in different countries; the direct acquirer and 
acquirer ultimate parent reside in the same country and also the direct target and target ultimate parent 
reside in the same country. CFC rule takes the value one, if the country has implemented CFC rules in 
2014. Each country has at least one acquiring firm and one target firm to ensure that maximum 
likelihood estimation yields finite likelihood. 
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Table 15. Definition, data sources and summary statistics of variables for analyzing effect of CFC rules on direction of cross-border M&As (Section 4.4). 
Variable Definition Data source Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
∆CFC_value Difference in CFC value of the two firms (see Section 4.2) Tax guides 1,199 0.059 1.536 -3 3 
∆CFC_dummy Difference in CFC rule of the two firms (see Section 4.2) Tax guides 1,580 -0.069 0.466 -1 1 
∆STR Difference in STRs, including typical local taxes, of the two firms (in %) Tax guides 1,199 1.149 9.233 -26.706 26.823 
∆DTM Difference in method to avoid double taxation on foreign dividends of two firms 
where 0 (1) represents the credit (exemption) method 
Tax guides 1,199 -0.008 0.690 -1 1 





1,199 0.799 0.301 -0.990 1.000 
∆PTI Difference in pre-tax incomes of the two firms divided by the sum of the firms’ pre-
tax incomes, where non-positive values of pre-tax income are replaced by 0.001 to 
avoid low values in the denominator 
SDC 1,199 0.645 0.550 -1.000 1.000 
∆Leverage Difference in leverage ratios of the two firms (total liabilities/total assets, in %) SDC; Compustat 
North America; 
Compustat Global 
1,199 -0.082 0.942 -22.413 4.314 
∆StockMrk Difference in stock market capitalizations of the two countries divided by the sum 
of the countries’ stock market capitalization volume 
World Bank 1,199 0.104 0.783 -1.000 1.000 
∆CreditMrk Difference in domestic credits to private sector of the two countries divided by the 
sum of the countries’ domestic credit volume  
World Bank 1,199 0.089 0.732 -0.997 0.998 
∆Inflation Difference in inflation rates of the two countries (in %) World Bank 1,199 0.037 2.106 -13.352 11.742 
Data on country fixed effects are not reported but are available upon request. These statistics show relative values of the variables when firm a acquires firm b, see 
expression (11). For example, if firm a has a leverage ratio of 0.45 and firm b has a leverage ratio of 0.50, then ∆Leverage takes the value -0.05 (=0.45-0.50). 
 
41 / 44 
 
Table 16. Effect of CFC rules on direction of cross-border M&As (Section 4.4). 
Explanatory variables Level of 
direct acquirer 
& direct target 
Level of acquirer ult. par. & target ult. par. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆CFC_value -1.127**  -1.438**  -2.025a  
 (0.530)  (0.701)  (1.558)  
∆CFC_dummy  -2.027*  -3.543**  -10.944*** 
  (1.132)  (1.754)  (2.620) 
∆STR 0.168* 0.096** 0.278*** 0.062 0.693*** 0.079 
 (0.086) (0.038) (0.105) (0.043) (0.254) (0.058) 
∆DTM -0.242 0.201 -0.910 -0.399 -1.833** -0.881 
 (0.652) (0.671) (0.853) (0.879) (0.927) (1.040) 
∆Size 5.101*** 5.509*** 5.480*** 5.698*** 7.523*** 6.037*** 
 (0.398) (0.409) (0.501) (0.477) (1.403) (0.886) 
∆PTI 1.177*** 1.128*** 1.399*** 1.307*** 1.571 0.906 
 (0.407) (0.375) (0.466) (0.366) (1.040) (0.844) 
∆Leverage 0.158** 0.216** 0.123* 0.206** -0.098 -0.372 
 (0.068) (0.086) (0.068) (0.083) (0.983) (0.638) 
∆StockMrk 4.914*** 2.802** 6.446*** 3.004** 9.175*** 2.896 
 (1.615) (1.292) (2.278) (1.459) (3.105) (2.410) 
∆CreditMrk -6.363*** -2.533* -8.826*** -3.069 -9.829* 0.013 
 (1.848) (1.403) (2.851) (1.884) (5.900) (4.130) 
∆Inflation 0.193 0.083 0.321 0.132 0.245 0.002 
 (0.205) (0.171) (0.245) (0.210) (0.534) (0.427) 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,199 1,580 989 1,305 418 492 
Number of countries 30 31 30 30 29 29 
Log-likelihood -99.2 -133.6 -70.2 -100.7 -24.8 -38.1 
Time period 2002-2014 1995-2014 2002-2014 1995-2014 2002-2014 1995-2014 
Logit regressions of probability of being the acquirer country on (potential) CFC rules in a cross-border 
M&A; see expression (11). For variable definitions and data sources, see Table 15. All regressions control 
for country fixed effects, which are available upon request. Regressions (1) and (2) consider M&As where 
the direct acquirer and direct target reside in the same country as their respective ultimate parents. 
Regressions (3) and (4) are the same as (1) and (2), but require that the direct acquirer and the direct target 
are the respective groups’ ultimate parents. Regressions (5) and (6) are the same as (3) and (4), but exclude 
M&As involving the United States. Regressions (2), (4) and (6) consider in addition years 1995-2001; due 
to a lack of more detailed historic CFC rule data ∆CFC_value cannot be constructed for the time period 
1995-2001. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust 
standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
a
 The level of statistical significance is 19.4%. 
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